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CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION:
HOW DAVIS V. WASHINGTON REINS IN
CRAWFORD’S REACH
JOSEPHINE ROSS*

I.

INTRODUCTION: FROM CRAWFORD TO DAVIS, WHAT THOSE
OPINIONS TELL US

There were only two years from the time that the Supreme Court
announced a revolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford
v. Washington1 to the time that the Supreme Court took up the issue again
in Davis v. Washington.2 During those two years, hundreds of trial and
appellate judges were obligated to implement Crawford, often reviewing
the same cases where convictions had been affirmed under pre-Crawford
case law. This subset of decisions offers a unique opportunity to investigate
how lower courts implement Supreme Court decisions that are controversial
and ambiguous.3 The switch in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence had
enormous potential for upheaval in criminal law, particularly in the area of
domestic violence prosecutions. At the time that Crawford was announced
in 2004, trial courts were routinely permitting domestic violence prosecutions to proceed when the alleged victim did not appear to testify and there
were no witnesses to the event. Instead, statements the complainant made to
the 911 operator or to the police at the scene were repeated at trial. There
was no right to cross-examine or confront the person who made the
statements, only the police officer who repeated the missing witness’ statements. Although this practice of witnessless prosecutions in domestic
violence cases was fairly new, it had become entrenched by Crawford’s
time.4
*
Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Dean Kurt Schmoke for a summer grant, Susan Henderson-Utis and Valerie Collins for their
excellent research assistance, and Lisa Crooms and Andrew Taslitz for their helpful feedback.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
3. The term “lower courts” is used in this article to indicate both state courts and federal
circuit courts, although the article focuses primarily on state courts because they are where the
majority of domestic violence cases proceed.
4. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-58 (1992) (affirming the expanded use of the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in a witnessless child abuse case and thereby
signaling that the Confrontation Clause permits prosecutors to proceed without live witnesses in
domestic violence prosecutions by using the excited utterance exception); Josephine Ross, After
Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, if fully implemented,
would have returned trial courts to the days when domestic violence cases
were dismissed when witnesses failed to appear at trial.5 Although Crawford was a notoriously ambiguous opinion, leaving “for another day” the
precise scope of its ruling, it heralded an end to the practice of witnesses
testifying in absentia.6 Rather than reading the decision broadly and reversing domestic violence convictions that were based on out-of-court statements to police repeated at trial or on out-of-court phone calls played at
trial, courts found ways to affirm the convictions by reading, or, as I posit,
misreading the Supreme Court precedent. The 2006 Supreme Court case of
Davis v. Washington7 specifically addressed the types of evidence frequently introduced in domestic abuse prosecutions without the witness present to
cross-examine, namely, 911 calls and statements to police at the scene. In
Davis, the Court had an opportunity to correct the lower courts’ narrow
interpretation of Crawford. Instead, Davis seemed to forget the principles
annunciated in Crawford, such as that “no man shall be prejudiced by
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine,”8 and that our system of justice is based on a “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in
court subject to adversarial testing.”9 Davis provided no constitutional
protection for many defendants facing trial based on out-of-court
accusations without the witness there to testify face-to-face or to crossexamine. By examining the cases decided between Crawford and Davis,
we can recognize that Davis represents a capitulation to the lower court
judges who offered various methods of limiting the scope of Crawford’s
promised protections for those accused of crimes.
Judicial decision-making is generally understood to work in a topdown manner, with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchy.10 Social
Science researchers Songer, Segal and Cameron envisioned the relationship

Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 153-54 (2006) (noting that where the author
practiced, it was not until 1999 that this became routine).
5. Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003) (estimating that eighty to ninety percent of domestic violence
victims recant or do not come to court).
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. Crawford was not a domestic violence prosecution but a
murder case in which the government introduced a statement to police by a witness to the crime
that was then repeated at trial when the witnessed exercised her marital privilege.
7. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)).
9. Id. at 43 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
373-74 (1768)).
10. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 295 (2005) “In
the legal academy, thinking about the judicial system is distinctly top-down. There is a hierarchy,
and at the pinnacle sits the Supreme Court.” Id.
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between the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts as an owner walking
a dog on a leash.11 The Supreme Court is the owner and the lower courts
(the dogs) are expected to stay with the owner. When the Supreme Court
changes course, it is like a pull on the leash, and the lower courts will
follow. Sometimes the lower court judges want to go the same way as the
high court—what researchers call “congruence”—and sometimes judges
simply alter their decisions to conform to the desires of the Supreme Court,
what researchers call “responsiveness.”12 Researchers note that it is often
difficult to determine whether decisions that conform to precedent are
congruent with the attitudes of the lower court judges or whether the judges
are simply responding to the precedent.13 Some decisions allow more leash
than others, but there is almost always some room given within opinions for
lower court deviation. It is only when the dog goes beyond the discretion
provided by the original precedent that the Supreme Court needs to rein in
the dog, reversing the case.
Political scientists use the term “shirking” to apply to lower court
judges who do not wish to implement the policy but do anyway because of
the principal-agent hierarchy.14 In a recent article, Pauline Kim embraced
the leash analogy but criticized applying the term “shirking” to judges who
ultimately conform their rulings to precedent.15 Kim argues that the term
shirking “is implicitly pejorative”16 and that it is good judicial practice for
lower courts to decide cases using their own policy preferences as long as
these preferences are within the zone of discretion provided by the higher
court.17 Post-Crawford domestic violence opinions enable us to flesh out
Professor Kim’s theory against the backdrop of real case decisions. I use
the phrase “straining the leash” for what the lower courts did postCrawford, signaling their discomfort with forbidding witness statements in
the absence of live witnesses to domestic violence situations.
In a twist on the walking a dog paradigm, the Supreme Court opinion
in Davis appears to have been influenced by the state courts shirking or
straining at the leash. What the Davis decision suggests is that it is not

11. Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice:
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 673, 674-75 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 689 (whether the appellate court panels’ “responsiveness to the High Court . . . is
enhanced by the Court’s monitoring or is solely a function of their own internalized norms that are
reinforced by their peers in the circuit is difficult to determine empirically”).
14. Id. at 674.
15. Pauline Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 386 n.13, 386-87 (2007).
16. Id. at 413 n.121.
17. Id. at 394.
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always a question of the Supreme Court declaring a constitutional right and
the lower courts diligently struggling to interpret the opinion and implement
it. In the context of the right to confrontation, we see the lower courts
resisting implementation of the newly expanded constitutional right and, in
turn, the Supreme Court influenced by this resistance.
II. CRAWFORD ANNOUNCED A REINVIGORATED RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION
Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion in Crawford, announcing a
new era for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Crawford overruled a line of cases commencing in 1980 with Ohio v. Roberts,18
which had tied to the fluid rules of evidence the right of the accused to
confront witnesses. The Confrontation Clause would no longer be welded
to the hearsay rules, but would require its own independent review.19
The text of the Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”20 The term “witnesses,” Scalia explained, applies to those
who “bear testimony.”21 If a statement is “testimonial” in nature, Scalia
wrote, the Constitution requires nothing less than cross-examination,
assuming that the witness was available for trial.22 If the witness is
unavailable, the Constitution allows prior testimony where there was an
opportunity for cross-examination.23 It was intolerable that judges would
decide that evidence was particularly reliable under the Roberts format and
therefore dispense with the requirement of face-to-face confrontation and
cross-examination. Reliability may be useful for rules of evidence, but the

18. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
19. The opinion was joined by six other justices while Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice O’Connor, wrote a concurrence highly critical of the majority’s new jurisprudence.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69-76 (2004). Both dissenters were no longer on the bench
for the Davis v. Washington case in 2006. 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2270 (2006). Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s concurrence was highly critical of the majority’s break with prior jurisprudence.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-76. In determining the future of Crawford in Supreme Court
jurisprudence one must note that Crawford’s validity will not be threatened by the replacement of
the Chief Justice in 2005 and Justice O’Connor in 2006, since they both participated in the
minority opinion in Crawford’s 7-2 split. If anything, Crawford’s continued validity is even more
assured.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees in criminal cases the right to a speedy, public trial by jury, the right to be informed of
the nature of the accusation, the right to confront witnesses, the right to counsel, and the right to
compulsory process (for defendant to call witnesses). Id.
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. at 59.
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Constitution required that the jurors decide whether evidence is reliable and
credible.24
Crawford declined to define the term “testimonial,” and the lower
courts misinterpreted the opinion’s ambiguity.25 Crawford intended a
sweeping change in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis in
order to return to what was guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Crawford’s
majority opinion discussed what confrontation means “at a minimum” and
nowhere said that confrontation rights must be kept to this minimum. The
Court wrote that “the infamous proceedings against Sir John Fenwick [in
England]” in 1696 “must have burned into the general consciousness the
vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination.”26 The
Court further wrote that: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with [a] jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”27 The Court thus envisioned an end to trial judges permitting outof-court statements without confrontation rights simply because the evidence rules permit the statements. Moreover, the Court’s conclusion that
statements introduced against Mr. Crawford violated his right to confront
witnesses could easily have been reached under older established law, were
the Court not interested in breathing new life into a right that had been
languishing.28 The thrust of the decision was a broadening of rights
coupled with an invitation for later Supreme Court opinions to flesh out the
full reach of Crawford. 29
24. See Ross, supra note 4, at 53 for a further discussion of Crawford’s distrust of judges and
for a comparison of the concepts of reliability and credibility. If the term “testimonial” is defined
narrowly, then judges will again be in the business of deciding that evidence is so reliable that
cross-examination will not aid the jury in making a decision. Richard Friedman, Confrontation:
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1028 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman,
Confrontation]. “If a witness delivers live testimony at trial, the court does not excuse the witness
from cross-examination on the ground that the evidence is so reliable that cross-examination is
unnecessary to assist the determination of truth.” Id.
25. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
26. Id. at 45-46 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-592 (H.C. 1696); 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 22).
27. Id. at 62.
28. See id. at 69 (stating that the Chief Justice concurred in the result and dissented in the
Court’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). Justice Thomas sought to
create a ceiling to confrontation rights in his concurrence in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring) but that idea is not expressed in Crawford.
29. Although most jurisdictions have narrowed the reach of Crawford, there are at least two
jurisdictions that interpret Crawford broadly:
Georgia: See Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. 2004) (noting that a statement
at the scene was testimonial but harmless error); see also Pitts v. State, 627 S.E.2d 17,
2 (Ga. 2006) (holding that it was harmless error to admit testimonial statement when a
police officer testified about what witness told him shortly after the defendant shot
into the bedroom in which she was sleeping). “Georgia courts have adopted a broad
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A. THE TERM “CORE” IMPLIES THERE IS A ZONE OF PROTECTION
LARGER THAN THE CORE
Consider the word “core” within the Crawford opinion. The decision
lists several possible definitions of “core” testimonial rights, but nowhere
says that the right to confrontation must only apply to these core testimonial
rights.30 While the opinion was likely a compromise, and the justices may
have had different concepts of the scope of the revitalized Confrontation
Clause, the common usage of the term “core” supports the interpretation
that there is more to protect than just the core. In the dictionary, “core” is
defined as the “fibrous central part of certain fruits . . . containing the
seeds;” also as “the basic or most important part; the essence.”31 It is never
the whole, but always a central part. To determine if something falls outside of the purview of confrontation rights, one would need to understand
the core definition and core values the Clause protects, but the core would
hardly describe the full landscape of evidence protected.
Many scholars interpreted Crawford’s focus on the definition of “core”
testimonial statements to mean that the resuscitated Confrontation Clause
only applied to core testimonial statements.32 However, the opinion uses
terms such as “at a minimum,” signifying that the Sixth Amendment covers
much more than the minimum. Consider this sentence from the text: “it
applies at a minimum to . . . the modern practices with closest kinship to the
abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” such as police
interrogations.33 Or consider this quotation: “Statements taken by police

interpretation of interrogation and have generally found statements made to police are
testimonial.” State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 772 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing several
Georgia decisions).
Hawaii: In State v. Grace, the court found that statements made to police at the scene
by ten and eleven year olds explaining how their mother was hit were testimonial
because they “were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” 111
P.3d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005). However, the court may have been influenced by
the fact that the police officer did not establish a solid foundation for an excited
utterance, testifying that they were not upset; rather, “they seen what happened so they
were anxious to tell what they saw.” Id. at 31.
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-56.
31. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 407 (4th ed.
2000).
32. See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Remains of Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due
Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 39 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/cjmag/20-2/taslitz.html (“The scope of that core[—]and thus the
meaning of ‘testimonial’—was not decisively demarcated by Crawford.”); see also Robert P.
Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses,
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513 (2005) (stating that “Justice Scalia’s opinion points towards a
narrow construction” although Mosteller thinks there is room for a somewhat broader view).
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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officers in the course of interrogations are also ‘testimonial’ under even a
narrow standard.”34 This language suggests not only that there were multiple types of core statements but that the Supreme Court intended to cover
more than the mere core discussed.
B. IN FREE SPEECH THE CORE IS NOT THE CIRCUMFERENCE
The use of the term “core” in First Amendment jurisprudence points
the way to a proper reading of the term “core” in Crawford. When the
Crawford opinion discussed “possible core definitions” of testimonial statements, the Court meant those statements that most implicate the values that
the Sixth Amendment was designed to protect.35 Similarly, the word “core”
is used in free speech jurisprudence to identify those forms of speech that
most implicate the values that the First Amendment was designed to
protect.36 For example, political speech is said to be “core” speech.37 In
deciding whether the term “core” in Crawford signals a broad or narrow
conception of the Confrontation Clause, we should look to the First
Amendment doctrine, where the concept of core values has been established
through Supreme Court case law.
Free speech doctrine is instructive for a number of reasons. First, in
the free speech arena, the Supreme Court does not limit protection only to
those forms of speech that the Court defines as core.38 Case law created a
hierarchy where core speech receives more protection than non-core speech,
but only a few categories of speech fall completely outside the First

34. Id. at 52.
35. Id. at 51-52; see also Brief for Petitioner at 23, 33-34, Crawford v. Washington, No. 029410 (U.S. July 24, 2003) (using the term core as in “core concerns of the Confrontation Clause”
but explicitly excluding from the clause only “hearsay statements made unrelated to any pending
or potential prosecution.”).
36. See generally Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (“[P]olitical belief and
association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.”).
37. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“[C]ontributions to political
campaigns generate essential political speech. And contribution caps, which place a direct and
substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the utmost skepticism and should receive the
strictest scrutiny.”).
38. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (citing Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)) (“As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content . . . [h]owever, this principle, like other First Amendment
principles, is not absolute.”); see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 757
(1985) (“[W]hen the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern . . . we must . . .
balance the State’s interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation
against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression.”).

394

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:387

Amendment’s reach.39 First Amendment doctrine therefore supports a
broad reading of the Confrontation Clause, in which the clause protects
more than just “core” testimonial statements. Second, in the free speech
arena, the Court has never settled on one definition of “core” speech or
“core” purpose for the First Amendment, but has allowed a variety of core
purposes to remain within the doctrine. In Crawford, the Court did not
choose one core definition of testimonial but proffered several. The First
Amendment doctrine suggests that the Court need not decide on any one
core definition of testimonial statements. A jurisprudence that allows several definitions of core testimonial statements to co-exist will provide more
protection to defendants than if the Supreme Court insists on one definition.
A third way that First Amendment jurisprudence can inform Confrontation
Clause analysis is by examining the role that the fear of governmental abuse
plays in interpreting the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 40
Although Crawford correctly recognized that the Confrontation Clause was
designed as a check on governmental power, Davis used this insight to
incorrectly limit the clause to statements taken by police for certain
purposes.41
Turning to the first issue, the Supreme Court does not limit free speech
protections only to core speech. Although the Court has articulated what it
considers to be core expression, much expression that would never be
labeled political or core by any stretch of the imagination enjoys First
Amendment protection. There is a hierarchy of speech that allows different
degrees of protection depending upon whether speech is labeled as core
speech or categorically unprotected speech, or something in-between.
Categorically unprotected speech is limited to obscenity, fighting words,
libel or slander, threats or advocacy of illegal action, but even this type of

39. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues
‘has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”); Wilson R
Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral:
The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 827 (2004) (emphasis omitted) (arguing
that the Court is moving away from speech categories towards a test that looks “upon the degree
to which the law suppressed expression of particular ideas or denied people the opportunity to
express themselves”).
40. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependant upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a majority to silence
dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.
Id.
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53; Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

2007]

CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION

395

speech does not fall wholly outside First Amendment protection.42 By
naming the types of speech that fall outside the purview of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court allows other types of non-core speech
to enjoy protection even though the rights are subject to certain types of
governmental regulation.43
One ready example of non-core speech is commercial speech, for
although it is less protected than other kinds of speech, advertisements and
other forms of commercial speech have had constitutional protection for
thirty years.44 The debate about what theory underlies free speech rights
takes place in the margins, not at the core. In determining whether certain
speech is beyond the First Amendment canopy, courts enunciate versions of
core principles to determine if the speech at issue furthers the principles laid
forth.45 In commercial cases, the value of the public receiving information
about products has been given various amounts of importance.46 Generally,

42. Even for categories of unprotected speech, the First Amendment does not condone
viewpoint discrimination. See Virginia v. Black, 583 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (stating that statute
may ban cross burning for purposes of intimidation for “[u]nlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., the
Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward one of the
specified disfavored topics.”). For cases allowing regulation of unprotected speech see, e.g., Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25
(1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (fighting words);
see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (allowing government to forbid advocacy
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” that “is likely to incite or produce
such action”).
43. Some types of speech that are recognized to fall outside of core speech but still enjoy
protection are sexual speech, campaign financing, and commercial speech. See, e.g., Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (invalidating a law banning sexual materials that do not
meet the Court’s definition of obscene); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155
(2003) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28, 47 (1976) (per curiam)) (stating that campaign
contributions carry “a plain threat to political integrity”); Suzanne Sherry, Hard Cases Make Good
Judges, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 3, 4 (2004) (determining that while commercial speech receives
constitutional protection, it is subject to more regulation than non-commercial speech).
44. See Sherry, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that since Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) the Court continues to affirm that
“commercial speech is constitutionally protected but subject to greater regulation than noncommercial speech”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) (“The Statute must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech.”). However, “commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a
hardy breed of expression that is not ‘particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation.’” Id. at 564 n.6.
45. In determining whether a particular form of speech falls outside First Amendment
protection, the Court looks at the meaning and core purpose of the Free Speech Clause, but does
not limit protection only to those forms of speech that formed the core purpose of the First
Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“All ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable
because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.”).
46. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (according less protection to commercial speech and
not branding the right to make informed decisions as core); but see id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the advertising ban that promotes the use of electricity as “strikes at
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information about a product or service is not viewed as core and the Court
has fashioned rules for commercial speech regulation that are different than
those for pure political or artistic expression.47
Borrowing from the First Amendment context, the Court may continue
to have various formulations of core protected statements while bestowing a
different test for protecting non-core statements. Only certain statements
need fall outside of any constitutional scrutiny, just as only a few categories
of speech—such as obscenity—fall completely outside of First Amendment
protection.48 An analogy to free speech jurisprudence suggests that the
term “core” describes the most important purposes served by a section in
the Bill of Rights without restricting the Amendment to its core purposes.
Turning to the second issue above, there is no single definition of core
value in free speech cases. When determining the standard for libel, free
speech has been described as valuable because it provides “uninhibited
robust and wide-open debate on public issues.”49 In an obscenity case, free
speech was described as important because it provides audiences with
“serious literary, artistic or scientific value.” 50 In deciding whether fighting
words should fall inside or outside the scope of protection, the Court has
considered the importance of the “exposition of ideas.”51 Recognizing that
the value of the free speech clause is both personal and societal, the Court
wrote that the “freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of
individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the
common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.”52 Thus,
there are multiple values that the First Amendment was designed to protect,
the heart of the First Amendment” and calling the advertising regulation a “covert attempt by the
State to manipulate the choice of its citizens [and] . . . depriv[e] the public of the information
needed to make a free choice”).
47. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) (“To require a parity of
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution,
simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter
kind of speech.”).
48. One could argue that the First Amendment is different because of the fear of chilling
expression and because it is such an expansive right. On the other hand, the Confrontation Clause
is already bounded by certain facts that make it much less unwieldy even if the right were deemed
absolute; namely, it only applies to a trial of a criminal case where the government is attempting
to introduce the evidence. It is further bounded by the fact that it only arises in situations where
evidence law would otherwise render evidence admissible, and the rule is limited by other factors
such as the forfeit rule.
49. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
50. There has been friction in the obscenity arena about how much speech outside the core is
included within the First Amendment, but it is has never been limited to core values such as
political discourse. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[B]efore today, the protections of the First Amendment have never been thought to
be limited to expressions of serious literary or political value.”).
51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
52. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988).
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including political ideas, literary merit, scientific ideas, the right to speak
one’s mind as well as the value of public debate.
Similarly, in the Sixth Amendment context, there is no necessity for the
Court to provide only one core purpose or core definition of the Confrontation Clause. Given the free speech doctrine in this area, readers of
Crawford should not assume that there is only one core definition of
testimonial. Instead, readers should assume that as new confrontation
issues greet the Court, the Court is likely to expand its understanding of the
core purposes of the clause as it has in the context of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. The term “core,” therefore, signifies an
expansive view of the reinvigorated right to confront witnesses. The
Confrontation Clause has the capacity to have multiple core values as does
the First Amendment.
Turning to the third issue above, free speech doctrine is also useful in
helping to determine what should constitute “core” testimonial statements.
To determine core protections for any constitutional right, one begins by
identifying the purpose of the Amendment.53 The First Amendment, like
the Sixth Amendment, is informed by the Framers’ healthy distrust of
governmental overreaching. In the free speech context, the Amendment
broadly guards against control of what people think and say.54 The fear of
government translates into all cases where the government is prosecuting
individuals for free expression, even where the government had no hand in
producing the expression, only in suppressing it.55 Moreover, fear of
governmental abuse is so broadly enforced that it even extends to private
actions for libel. The government is the actor in these cases only in the
sense that the state allows libel actions to proceed.56 Even speech that is

53. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
54. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 (“At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of
the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern.”).
55. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (involving an epithet on a jacket).
Although speech occurring in a public forum generally receives more protection than private
speech, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, Justice Rehnquist wrote that “fostering private speech” constitutes
an interest of the “highest order.” 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In
Bartnicki, the Court upheld the right of radio station to broadcast intercepted cell phone
conversation despite wiretap laws that protected privacy by forbidding the broadcast of illegally
intercepted conversations. Id. at 544.
56. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (“[H]ere, we are
attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional
command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for
defamatory falsehood reach no further than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest
involved.”).
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uttered from one private individual to another is still clearly protected from
prosecution under the First Amendment.57
The way that distrust of government informs constitutional doctrine for
First Amendment analysis should help the Court embrace a broad understanding of the term testimonial for Confrontation Clause analysis. In a
prior article, I argued that the Confrontation Clause should not turn on
whether a police officer gathered the information, since the prosecutor is a
government actor and it is the prosecutor who seeks to present the evidence
at trial as testimony against the accused.58 The phrase “witness against” the
accused in the Confrontation Clause should refer to whether the statements
serve the same purpose as live testimony at trial, not the intent of the person
making the statement or taking the statement when it was first uttered.59
First Amendment analysis supports this broad understanding of what constitutes core testimony, for free speech rights are hardly limited to patrolling
governmental production of statements.
As in First Amendment case law, there is no reason for the Court to
limit Sixth Amendment protections depending upon how the police
obtained statements. If free speech recognizes government action to occur
where there is prosecution or fear of prosecution, then the Confrontation
Clause should also recognize the danger of governmental abuse in the fact
of prosecution itself. That the government used or plans to use these
statements in a courtroom to prosecute an individual should be enough to
qualify these statements for Sixth Amendment protection even if the police
initially gathered the statements for purposes other than law enforcement.
After all, the courts want police to continue investigating crimes and to
continue taking statements from witnesses, just as the Framers wanted
witnesses to testify before grand juries. It is the repetition of the statements
and not the manner in which the statements were taken that creates a
violation of the Bill of Rights. There is the potential of governmental abuse
in the act of prosecution and in the Sixth Amendment context; the specific
danger is that of prosecutors obtaining convictions based on out-of-court
statements without live witnesses. By analogizing to the free speech arena,
one can grasp how broadly the Crawford opinion should be understood. By
using the term “core,” the opinion described the most important purposes
served by this clause in the Bill of Rights without restricting the
Confrontation Clause to these core purposes. The opinion set out a range of
possible definitions of core, allowing for an expansion of protections as

57. See generally Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
58. Ross, supra note 4, at 196-98.
59. Id. at 215.
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different core values become clear. And finally, the Court’s focus on governmental abuse as an underpinning of the Confrontation Clause supports a
broad reading of the clause just as the First Amendment is implicated
whenever the government prosecutes an individual for statements made,
regardless of whether the government helped create the statement.60
The First Amendment is not the only area of law where the term core
refers to only some of what the Constitution protects. Initially, the Miranda
warnings were treated by the Supreme Court as a prophylactic rule designed
to advance core constitutional protections.61 In Dickerson v. United States,
the Supreme Court finally declared the Miranda warnings to be a constitutional rule, overturning a law that instructed courts to ignore Miranda
when determining the validity of confessions.62 Even though Miranda was
finally recognized as a constitutionally mandated rule, it is not viewed as a
core constitutional right.63 Justice Thomas defined “the core protection
afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause” to be “a prohibition on compelling a criminal defendant to testify against himself at trial” and also
described the clause as advancing the goal of “assuring trustworthy
evidence,” presumably by preventing false confessions.64 Thomas recognized that there was not a complete fit between the core concerns of the
Confrontation Clause and the mandated Miranda warnings. In United
States v. Patane, Justice Thomas noted that Miranda requirements “sweep
beyond the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”65 The

60. One sobering aspect of the First Amendment is that the protections tend to wane in times
of perceived national crisis. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919). In upholding the
Espionage Act of 1917, the Court seemed to accept a narrowing of the scope of what constitutes
protected political dissent and a broadening of what constitutes advocacy of illegal action and
categorically unprotected speech. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“We
admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the
circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done.”). One could analogize here to Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence, where perhaps the Court is influenced by the perceived crisis in crime, including
domestic violence.
61. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 467-72 (1966) (establishing Miranda warnings and the right of individuals to protection
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution).
62. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441-44 (2000). (“Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”); see Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards And Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1274, 1305 (2006) (discussing the constitutionality of the Miranda rule).
63. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-42 (2004).
64. Id. at 637; see Note, Constitutional Law, 18 HARV. L. REV. 296, 298-300 (2004)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433 (attributing the
longstanding inadmissibility of coerced confessions in English and American law to the belief that
such confessions are inherently unreliable); see also Note, Self-Incrimination, 116 HARV. L. REV.
302, 312, n.56 (2002).
65. Patane, 542 U.S. at 639.
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Miranda rule “creates a presumption of coercion” in order to protect against
“the possibility of coercion inherent in custodial interrogations.”66 This
protective rule should only be extended to exclude evidence seized as a
result of non-Mirandized statements if this extension would extend “the
‘Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence’ or by any deterrence rationale.”67 Thus, Fifth Amendment protection of core principles,
like the First Amendment protection, involves a protective layer surrounding the core.
By discussing protections outside of the core, I do not mean to suggest
that the formula set forth in Ohio v. Roberts 68 for determining the application of the Confrontation Clause continued to have force after Crawford.
The Roberts formula was based on the notion that reliable evidence need
not be tested through live testimony subject to cross-examination, and,
consequently, allowed judges to determine what was reliable.69 If evidence
was reliable, then the confrontation requirement could be lifted. As
Professor Taslitz has noted, if Roberts survived, it would be through a
residual due process analysis separate from the Sixth Amendment. 70
Crawford analyzed confrontation differently from Roberts. Unlike Roberts,
Crawford distrusted judges as gatekeepers.71 The core value being
protected in the Confrontation Clause was the process of determining
reliability and credibility, namely that the factfinder would determine these
after the witness testified by answering questions posed by counsel from
both sides. Thus, Crawford’s breadth is defined by its enunciated policy to
return criminal courts to a system where “no man shall be prejudiced by
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”72

66. Id.
67. Id. at 640 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985)).
68. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
69. Id. at 62-66.
70. Taslitz, supra note 32, at 40, 43 (“Thoroughly unreliable evidence entirely casually
unconnected with governmental action is thus not the Confrontation Clause’s concern. Roberts is
indeed dead.”).
71. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
72. Id. at 49 (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (Super. L. & Eq. 1794) (per curiam)).
Similarly, before the Confrontation Clause was adopted, the complaint at one state’s convention
was that it was still not determined whether an accused “is to be allowed to confront the witnesses
and have the advantage of cross examination.” Id. at 48 (citing 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863)).
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III. THE DAVIS DECISION REDUCED THE MINUMINUM CORE
PROTECTION TO THE MAXIMUM
When the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in a couple of domestic
violence prosecutions, resulting in Davis v. Washington, the Court had the
opportunity to reaffirm Crawford’s bold vision of the Sixth Amendment’s
right to confront witnesses.73 This opportunity was particularly important
because an overwhelming number of state courts and lower federal courts
had continued affirming domestic violence convictions where the primary
evidence against the defendants were accusations made out of court and
repeated at trial through police officers or 911 recordings.74
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court combined two domestic
violence prosecutions into one opinion, sometimes referred to as
Davis/Hammon since the other case reviewed was Hammon v. Indiana.75
Both cases involved the excited utterance exception to the rule against
hearsay.76 A statement constitutes an excited utterance (sometimes referred
to as a spontaneous utterance or spontaneous declaration) if it is made while
still under the stress of an exciting event, before the declarant has had time
to fabricate.77 John Henry Wigmore is generally recognized as the midwife
and advocate of the excited utterance exception, writing more than one
hundred years after the Sixth Amendment’s ratification.78 During the time
of the Framers, the res gestae exception distinguished between statements
that were “an inseparable part of the event itself,” from those that were
“purely narrative of what had already transpired.”79 Statements describing

73. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-80 (2006). The Davis Court reviewed two
domestic violence convictions, Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) and Washington
v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). Id. at 2270-73. The Davis Court reversed Hammon and
affirmed Davis. Id. at 2280.
74. See infra discussion section IV (discussing the misinterpretation of Crawford’s ambiguity in first responder cases).
75. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 448-49, rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), remanded to 853 N.E.2d
477 (Ind. 2006); Washington, 111 P.3d at 847, aff’d, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
76. In Hammon, the trial court also admitted the affidavit of the complainant as a present
sense impression. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447. “The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the
affidavit was properly admitted, reasoning that the issue was academic because the affidavit was
cumulative of Mooney’s testimony and therefore harmless, if error at all.” Id. at 448.
77. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
78. Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 159, 169 n.22 (1997); see also Margaret A. Berger,
The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint
Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, n.141 (1992) (establishing the timeframe for the birth of the
excited utterance and noting that Wigmore published three editions of his Treatise, in 1904, 1923
and 1939).
79. Brief of Petitioner at 11-12, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2005) (No. 05-5224),
2005 WL 3598182.
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a shocking or traumatic event were not admitted before Wigmore, with
perhaps a couple of cases that constituted exceptions to the general rule.
Wigmore examined these exceptions and brought a psychological gaze to
bear on the issue, concluding that the spontaneous utterance exception
should be unmoored from res gestae, and that people should be able to
testify about underlying events even if the retelling was not immediate. The
premise upon which excited utterance exception rests has long been in
doubt, namely that people are physically incapable of lying when they are
under great stress.80 An irony within the excited utterance exception is that
in order for a trial judge to conclude that a witness was under the influence
of a stressful event (generally the crime perpetrated against him), the trial
judge must first conclude that there was such a stressful event. In cases
where the only evidence of the stressful event was the alleged victim’s outof-court statement, the judge must determine the witness’s credibility without hearing the witness testify and without benefit of cross-examination.81
In an effort to prosecute criminal cases where eye-witnesses and
victims do not show up at trial, prosecutors began using the excited
utterance exception during the 1990s as a means to conduct witnessless
prosecutions.82 Under the Roberts framework, excited utterances were held
not to violate the Confrontation Clause because they were “firmly rooted”
exceptions to the hearsay rule and therefore inherently reliable.83 Hammon
and Davis are typical examples of witnessless domestic violence
prosecutions.
A. THE DECISION IN THE APPEAL OF DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
The facts in Davis were that an alleged victim of domestic violence
telephoned 911 and hung up. When the 911 operator phoned back, she
asked a series of questions, eliciting the allegation from the alleged victim

80. Stanley A. Goldman, Distorted Vision: Spontaneous Explanation as a “Firmly Rooted”
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 453, 462 (1990) (“Theoretically, the
excitement eliminates the witness’ capacity to reflect, thus precluding the ability to fabricate and
ensuring an accurate, reliable description of the event perceived.”); see also Robert M. Hutchins &
Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 435-38
(1928) (criticizing the notion that witnesses have no ability to fabricate once more than a few
seconds has transpired after the startling event).
81. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 162 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Tex. App. 2005) (involving a situation
in which there was independent evidence that an alleged victim was hurt but what happened was
established by a missing witness’ statements).
82. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1220 (2002).
83. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n.8 (1992).
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that she was being assaulted at her home by the defendant.84 The operator
was also told that the defendant left the home during the phone call.85 The
complainant did not appear at trial and the 911 tape was played for the jury,
who convicted the defendant. The trial judge allowed the statements in as
excited utterances,86 and the appeals court—hearing the case after Crawford
was decided—affirmed the conviction.
The Supreme Court upheld the use of the 911 tape at Mr. Davis’ trial
despite the absence of the witness at trial. The primary purpose of the
questions posed by the operator, the Court found, objectively indicated that
they were “to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency.”87 Where the
primary purpose of police questioning is to allow police to meet an ongoing
emergency, the statements made by the absent witness do not constitute
witness testimony under the Sixth Amendment, and the Confrontation
Clause does not apply.
The Supreme Court noted that later portions of the Davis 911 tape
might not have been primarily for emergency purposes, and urged future
trial courts to redact portions of 911 calls when “circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”88 Similarly, the Court deemed that
statements taken by police officers should not have come in, but that their
admission was harmless error.89 The Court distinguished the Davis facts
from those in Crawford and set forth a variety of criteria that lower courts
can use as a guide for deciding if evidence violates the Confrontation
Clause when admitted in the absence of a witness at trial.
B. THE DECISION IN THE APPEAL OF HAMMON V . INDIANA
The other case decided by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington
was Hammon v. Indiana.90 In Hammon, police officers interviewed an
alleged victim at the scene following an emergency response phone call.

84. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 (2006). The operator asked for the first
name then the last name and then the middle initial of the assailant. Id.
85. Id. The exchange was as follows: “911 Operator: Okay. What’s his middle initial?
Complainant: Martell. He’s runnin’ now.” Id.
86. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (indicating that excited utterances are alternatively referred to
as spontaneous utterances or spontaneous declarations).
87. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268-69.
88. Id. at 2269.
89. Id. at 2277-78. “That Court also concluded that, even if later parts of the call were
testimonial, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis does not challenge
that holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.” Id.
90. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005).
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Police separated the alleged victim from the alleged assailant who was still
in the house and asked the alleged victim to state what occurred before the
officers arrived. As in Davis, the alleged victim failed to appear at trial and
the witness statements were repeated at trial by the interviewing officer.
The Supreme Court reversed Mr. Hammon’s conviction, holding that
the statements at issue were similar to those in Crawford and could not be
introduced without the witness who made the statements testifying at trial
under oath.91 Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious
substitute for live testimony, “because they do precisely what a witness
does on direct examination,” and are therefore covered by the Confrontation
Clause.92
C. THE AMBIGUITY IN DAVIS WILL HELP FUTURE PROSECUTORS
Davis v. Washington must be understood as a retreat from the
principles laid out in Crawford. The Davis Court was asked to determine
whether the statements in Davis and Hammon were “testimonial,” a word
coined by Crawford to mean when a declarant of out-of-court statements
counts as a “witness” for the Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against you.93 If an out-of-court statement repeated at trial is testimonial, then the declarant is a witness and must appear for crossexamination unless the government has a reason that satisfies the Sixth
Amendment.94 If the statement is nontestimonial then the Confrontation
Clause does not even apply.95 Davis held that out-of-court statements
repeated at trial must be deemed “testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate . . . that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”96 In contrast, statements repeated at trial must be deemed
“nontestimonial” if they were “made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation . . . [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing

91. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. Hammon was also remanded: “The Indiana courts may
determine on remand whether a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing—under which one who obtains
a witness’s absence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation—is properly
raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is meritorious. Absent such a finding, the Sixth
Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon’s affidavit.” Id. at 2270.
92. Id. at 2278. “Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for
live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are
inherently testimonial.” Id.
93. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
94. Id. at 54-59.
95. Id. at 56.
96. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
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emergency.”97 That means that even if one person accuses another person
of a crime, that initial accusation may serve as the basis to bring charges,
hold the defendant before trial, and convict the defendant, if the police were
engaged in resolving an emergency at the time the accusation was made. It
makes little sense that a person’s opportunity to cross-examine a witness
rests not on whether the out-of-court statement serves to accuse the defendant at trial, but on the police officer’s reason for gathering the statement in
the first place. It also makes little sense that a witness who lied to a police
officer about a crime or the person who committed the crime need not
affirm his accusation before the court if the lie was made to an emergency
911 system, or if the police did not interrogate him. The holding in Davis
represents a dramatic retreat from the vision of the Confrontation Clause
ensuring our long-standing tradition of “live testimony in court subject to
adversarial testing.”98
Davis is consciously ambiguous, declining to “produce an exhaustive
classification of all conceivable statements” to determine whether the Confrontation Clause applies.99 Many questions remain in the aftermath of the
Davis decision. Is the concept of an emergency broad or narrow?100 Is it an
emergency when police need to find out whether an arrest should be made
and whether the person they might arrest has a violent history or just
behaved in a violent manner? Who has the burden of showing that there is
an ongoing emergency or that the emergency has ended? Does the decision
admit most 911 calls without the witness while barring statements taken at
the scene? Or does the application of the Confrontation Clause turn on how
the missing witness phrases her phone call and how the police phrase their
response at the scene?
As ambiguous as the primary purpose test is standing alone, Davis
lends it greater ambiguity by creating a test that is essentially a totality of
the circumstances test. The Court asks judges to consider a number of
factors in deciding whether a statement to a police officer is testimonial.101
The prongs of this test seem to have originated from state appellate court
decisions that provided narrow interpretations of Crawford’s holding, rather
than from any principled understanding of the purposes of the

97. Id. at 2274.
98. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 373-74).
99. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268.
100. Note that one of the amicus briefs in Davis used the term “safety concerns” rather than
the term “ongoing emergency” to delineate when evidence fell outside of the scope of the Confrontation Clause. On its face, “ongoing emergency” suggest a narrower exception than “safety
concerns” to the right to confront witnesses.
101. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
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Confrontation Clause.102 As Scalia himself has said, totality of the circumstances tests leave too much discretion to lower court judges.103 Scalia
wrote, “The common-law, discretion-conferring approach is ill suited,
moreover, to a legal system in which the Supreme Court can review only an
insignificant proportion of the decided cases.”104 “To adopt such an
approach, in other words, is effectively to conclude that uniformity is not a
particularly important objective with respect to the legal question at
issue.”105
In Section IV the reader will discover how appellate courts capitalized
on the ambiguities of Crawford v. Washington to forego face-to-face confrontation, despite the strong wording in that opinion condemning trials by
out-of-court accusation. There is no reason to suppose that Davis’ ambiguity supplies anything but encouragement to courts to continue allowing
prosecutors to introduce out-of-court accusations without giving the
accused the opportunity to test the credibility of the accuser through crossexamination. Indeed, the cases that have been decided in the year since
Davis was published prove exactly that.106
Robert Mosteller argued that confrontation rights were not assured as
long as they relied on behavior by the police because the police could
always alter their investigative techniques.107 Even before Davis, he
predicted that police departments could change their methods of gathering
information to help create evidence that would withstand a Sixth Amendment challenge.108 Davis invites police to do so by allowing them to gather
statements orally rather than in writing and by providing them an opportunity to characterize their questioning as part of an ongoing emergency
investigation. This article examines cases that were decided even before
police had an opportunity to change their methods. The cases discussed in
102. See discussion infra section IV (discussing first responder cases).
103. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 117980 (1989) (“Much better . . . to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to in
explanation of the decision.”). Id. at 1178.
104. Id. at 1178
105. Id. at 1179.
[W]here an appellate judge says that the remaining issue must be decided on the basis
of the totality of the circumstances, or by a balancing of all the factors involved, he
begins to resemble a finder of fact more than a determiner of law. To reach such a
stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat . . . equality of treatment is
difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered judicial system, impossible to achieve;
predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is
impaired.
Id. at 1182.
106. See infra discussion Section C (discussing the post-Davis decisions).
107. Mosteller, supra note 32, at 529-30, 539-40, 543-44, 566-68.
108. Id. at 538-40.
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this article were investigated before Davis and Crawford and in many
instances police had already testified about these investigations before they
had an opportunity to conform their evidence to Crawford’s new
Confrontation Clause ruling.
This article also shows that an even larger problem than defining
constitutional rights by the police’s investigatory actions is that courts can
manipulate their findings. Judges can take the totality of the circumstances
test in Davis and conclude that the statements were taken as part of an
ongoing investigation. Plus, appellate courts must be deferential to the
discretion of the trial judges since the trial judges heard the officers
testify.109 Moreover, even when the appellate courts were interpreting the
law, applying Crawford to domestic violence cases before Davis weakened
the new jurisprudence and appellate courts were routinely finding ways to
affirm convictions.110 The ambiguity in Davis, its focus on police practices,
and its totality of the circumstances test all sound the bugle for retreat from
confrontation rights for those charged with domestic violence.
D. DAVIS USED LACK OF PRECEDENT IN CONTRADICTORY WAYS
While Crawford used history to stress the importance of the Confrontation Clause, Davis used a lack of history in conflicting ways. Crawford
used history primarily to augment the idea of witnesses testifying at trial
rather than having out-of court statements read to the factfinder. For example, the Court cited an early American case for the proposition that “it is a
rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”111
This is similar to the Blackstone quotation: “The common-law tradition is
one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.”112 Or this
quote, reminding the reader that the Bill of Rights is rooted in distrust of
government: “The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte

109. See Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 815 (D.C. 2005) (noting that “[m]oreover,
the trial judge’s assessment of the events is especially significant, for she heard the testimony first
hand” and remanding the case for the trial judge to determine the circumstances under which the
statements were made to decide if the Confrontation Clause applied); but see People v. Johnson,
150 Cal. App. 1467, 1477-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“We independently review determinations
affecting a defendant’s constitutional rights.”).
110. See infra discussion Section IV (discussing the misinterpretation of Crawford’s
ambiguity in first responder cases).
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 104
(Super. L. & Eq. 1794)). Similarly, before the Confrontation Clause was adopted, the complaint
at one state’s convention was that it was still not determined whether an accused “is to be allowed
to confront the witnesses and have the advantage of cross examination.” Id. at 48.
112. Id. at 43 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at 373-74).
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testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was
elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.”113
There was a contradiction within Davis regarding the significance of a
lack of precedent connected to the seminal issue whether the Confrontation
Clause affirmatively guarantees a method of presenting testimony or
whether it only applies to abuses known to the Framers.114 In one section of
the decision, the Court celebrated the lack of precedent as proof that the
evidence was historically excluded from trials owing to the Confrontation
Clause.
We do not think it conceivable that the protections of the
Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a notetaking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the
declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition.
Indeed, if there is one point for which no case-English or early
American, state or federal-can be cited, that is it.115
In this quote, the Davis Court affirmed Crawford’s pronouncement that
unsworn statements are covered by the Confrontation Clause even if they
were not an abuse considered by the Framers.116 The very fact that there
was no prior case that discussed the application of the Sixth Amendment to
unsworn statements as in Mr. Hammon’s case proved to the Davis Court
that in the time of the Framers, these statements would not have been
permitted. The absence of case law here proved the breadth of the Sixth
Amendment.
In contrast, in another section of the decision, the Court celebrated the
lack of precedent as proof that the evidence was historically admitted at
trials, the very opposite conclusion from the quotation above. The Court
wrote:
Davis seeks to cast McCottry [the caller] in the unlikely role of a
witness by pointing to English cases. None of them involves statements made during an ongoing emergency. In King v. Brasier, 1
Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), for example, a young rape
victim, “immediately on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury” to her mother. Id., at 200, 168 Eng. Rep., at
202. The case would be helpful to Davis if the relevant statement

113. Id. at 66.
114. Id. at 52 n.3.
115. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006); see also id. at 2283 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court all but concedes that no case can be cited for its conclusion that the
Confrontation Clause also applies to informal police questioning under certain circumstances.”).
116. Id.
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had been the girl’s screams for aid as she was being chased by her
assailant.
Here, the Court assumed that because appellate counsel did not find an
early case that discussed whether the Sixth Amendment excluded hue and
cry evidence, the early courts must have allowed in such evidence. The
Supreme Court found that the absence of case law proved the limits rather
than the breadth of the Confrontation Clause in this instance. The two
quotations, therefore, indicate confusion about how to interpret a lack of
history and a lack of precedent. This confusion, in turn, makes it more
difficult to interpret how Davis answered the question about whether the
Confrontation Clause only addresses historic abuses or whether it also
included new forms of abuses that are created as the rules of evidence shift.
While Crawford stated that the Court would determine new abuses by deciding what the Framers would have thought,117 Davis muddied this issue,
helping to undue the broad protections announced just two years before.
The main problem with limiting the Confrontation Clause to those
modern practices with the closest kinship to abuses that the Framers thought
of at the time, is that other evidence the Framers did not think about, such
as excited utterances, may also serve to accuse the defendant and prejudice
the defendant. The more the term “testimonial” is limited, the more evidence will be introduced without the opportunity to cross-examine the
accusers. The process mandated by the Clause will become a right to confront some accusers but not others. For other accusations, there will be no
opportunity to confront the accusers. Judges, mistrusted by Crawford,
again become the guardians of whether evidence is reliable enough to
dispense with confrontation rights.118
In another article, I argue that the term “testimonial” is defined
improperly in Davis.119 In defining what is akin to testimony or
“testimonial,” the Davis Court mistakenly examined how the evidence was

117. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3.
But even if, as [the Chief Justice] claims, a general bar on unsworn hearsay made
application of the Confrontation Clause to unsworn testimonial statements a moot
point, that would merely change our focus from direct evidence of original meaning of
the Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference. We find it implausible that a provision
which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought trial by
unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.
Id.
118. For example, in State v. Davis the court noted that it was the trial judge that decided in
the first instance that the 911 call was reliable enough to be introduced, which allowed the
government to present the caller’s accusation against Mr. Davis as testimony not subject to crossexamination. 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005).
119. Ross, supra note 4, at 198-200.
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gathered rather than how the evidence was actually used at trial.120 The
Sixth Amendment is a trial right. The Confrontation Clause is not designed
to discourage or prevent the police from investigating crimes in a manner
that is consistent with the Fourth and Fifth Amendment. It does not prevent
people from making true or false accusations outside of court. What the
Clause is designed to prevent is the government using these statements to
establish that a person is guilty of a criminal charge without allowing the
factfinder to view the declarant as he or she takes an oath, answers questions formally and submits to cross-examination.121
One case from Ohio displays the problems of trusting judges to be
gatekeepers of reliability and the danger posed by Davis’ narrow reading of
Crawford. In State v. Byrd,122 police officers, responding to an altercation
between a man and a woman, interviewed both and thought that the woman
had started the fight. The only reason the police did not arrest the woman
was because the defendant interceded and begged them not to because she
was pregnant.123 Since the police were bound by state law to make an arrest
in domestic violence cases, they then arrested the man.124 Nevertheless, a
judge determined that the woman’s statements to the 911 operator and to
the police at the scene were reliable enough to dispense with crossexamination and defendant was convicted without the opportunity to probe
the declarant’s bias and credibility through cross-examination.125 The
appellate court in Byrd reversed the conviction after Crawford was decided,
holding that the statements at the scene were “testimonial,” but allowed the
case to proceed on remand based upon the statements to the operator.126
Thus, the government was allowed to try the defendant again based upon
some of the witness’ statements without her having to appear.127 It is easy
to imagine how a cross-examination of the caller could probe for bias and
help the jury determine if the person claiming to be the victim was really
the aggressor. Instead, once the judge decides on remand that the witness
provided reliable evidence to the operator, the jury may make a factual
determination of the accuser’s credibility without having an opportunity to

120. See id. (providing a more detailed explanation of this issue).
121. Id. at 195-213.
122. 828 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). Note that this was decided after Crawford but
before Davis; however, Davis seems to support the resolution of the case. Id.
123. Id. at 134.
124. Id. at 134-35.
125. Id. at 135.
126. Id. at 136-37.
127. Id. at 137. “Lastly, under Evid. R. 803(2), the availability of the declarant is immaterial.
Thus, it was of no consequence that the state did not call the female witness to testify and face
cross-examination from the accused.” Id.
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watch the witness answer questions on direct and cross-examination. This
scenario is likely to happen quite often after Davis. It is hardly the process
envisioned by the majority in Crawford v. Washington.
E.

DAVIS SHRUNK CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION SO THAT THE
CORE BECOMES THE PERIMETER

The Davis Court used the term “core” in a most haphazard way. The
Court wrote, “We must decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause
applies only to testimonial hearsay; and, if so, whether the recording of a
911 call qualifies.”128 That sounds like it was asking whether Roberts
survived Davis, a most important inquiry. The Court answered that Roberts
was dead, phrasing it this way: “A limitation so clearly reflected in the text
of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its
‘core,’ but its perimeter.”129 This is oddly phrased because the protection
around the core would not be the old Roberts’ reliability jurisprudence
anyway, but would be statements introduced at court whose introduction
would start impinging upon core confrontation concerns. Just as the
Miranda rules protect the core of the Fifth Amendment, so would a rule
preventing police from repeating accusations made to them protect the core
purpose of confrontation rights annunciated in Crawford. By using the
word “core” to identify a perimeter, the Davis Court collapsed the broad
possibilities of the term core in Crawford, and it did this incidentally, almost casually. Instead of the term “core” inviting protections surrounding
the core, the core became the circumference or perimeter of the scope of the
clause.
If statements made to law enforcement with the understanding that they
would be used as testimony at trial could be deemed nontestimonial under
the Davis test, then statements made to private persons would seem to be
per force excluded from the right to confront one’s accusers. Remember
that Crawford stated that: “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to . . . the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”130 With Davis, the minimum in fact became the maximum. The Court decided that the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with modern practices with the closest
kinship to the abuses of the past.131 The Supreme Court no longer imagined
a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” as it did in Crawford, but only

128.
129.
130.
131.

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006).
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274.
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one discreet definition.132 It would now be inconsistent for Crawford’s
third possible definition to survive Davis, namely statements made to private persons with the understanding that they would be used as testimony at
trial. In two years, the Court moved from Crawford’s proclamation that the
Confrontation Clause is a “bedrock procedural guarantee” and “the common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial
testing” to the cryptic language in Davis quoted above, that a “limitation so
clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be
said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”133
IV. FIRST RESPONDER CASES MISINTERPRET CRAWFORD’S
AMBIGUITY
Surprisingly, after Crawford, a majority of lower courts continued
allowing out-of-court statements of witnesses through police testimony.
They did so by interpreting the term “testimonial” in a narrow fashion so
that the Sixth Amendment applied to only a handful of incriminating
statements. Instead of treating the existence of various possible definitions
of core “testimonial” rights as an invitation to expand the rights of criminal
defendants, these courts seized upon the ambiguity in Crawford as a reason
to restrict the reach of the Confrontation Clause. Sometimes, the Confrontation Clause was interpreted so narrowly that it would not even apply to
the Crawford fact pattern.134
In the wake of Crawford, courts in numerous jurisdictions held that
Crawford did not prevent the government from introducing out-of-court
statements made by an accuser to police to prove the charges without the
opportunity for cross-examination.135
The post-Crawford, pre-Davis
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See discussion infra Section VI.A. (discussing that the test derives from a misreading of
Crawford’s third possible core definition).
135. See Chart in Appendix. The following cases affirmed convictions where statements
given to the police at the scene were repeated without the witness testifying in person:
Alaska: Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)
Arizona: State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350 (Ariz. 2005)
Colorado: People v. King, 121 P.3d 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005)
D.C.: Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005)
Maine: State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004)
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)
Michigan: People v. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
Minnesota: State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 2005)
Nebraska: State v. Hambertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005)
New York: New York v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 2004). For 911 cases,
there was a split of opinion. Compare New York v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y.
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decisions can be divided into three lines of reasoning in reaching the
conclusion that the excited utterance statements to police at issue are not
“testimonial.”
1. The “formality” rationale. Only statements given to police
officers during interrogation are formal enough to constitute
“testimonial” statements; therefore, statements made at the
scene of the crime are informal and not subject to the
Confrontation Clause. [Section V below]
2. The “state-of-mind” rationale. Unless the declarant intends
that the statements will be used at trial, statements given to police officers or private citizens do not constitute “testimonial”
statements. Some cases that read a “state-of-mind” requirement into Crawford opine that all excited utterances are
exempt from the Confrontation Clause because by definition
excited utterances are made without reflection so the speaker
could not have intended that the statements be used to
prosecute the accused. [Section VI below]
3. The “intent-of-the-officers” rationale. This set of cases looks
at the intent of the officers in asking questions of the witness to
determine what constitutes interrogation. Information gathered
as part of an emergency response falls outside the dictates of
the Confrontation Clause. [Section VII below]
The chart in Appendix A indicates that out of the thirty-two states that
have developed a theory in response to Crawford, thirty of these states have
interpreted Crawford narrowly, to exempt accusatory statements introduced
at domestic violence trials from the scope of the Confrontation Clause.136

2004) (illustrating a narrow reading of testimonial under state-of-mind rational) with
People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. 2004) (illustrating a broad reading of
testimonial).
North Carolina: North Carolina v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
This case was granted certiorari, judgment vacated and remanded for further
proceedings when the Court decided Davis. 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006).
Ohio: Ohio v. Mills, 2006 WL 1132543 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
Tennessee: State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 352 (Tenn. 2006).
Texas: Key v. Texas, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. 2005).
Washington: State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990 (Wash. 2005).
Wisconsin: Wisconsin v. Searcy, 709 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. 2005).
136. Two courts have taken a broad view of the Confrontation Clause, Georgia and Hawaii.
Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 354 (Ga. 2004); State v. Grace, 111 P.2d 28, 37 (Haw. Ct. App.
2005). In addition to the cases mentioned in supra note 135, the following cases have also
interpreted Crawford narrowly. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr.3d 846 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
2004); State v. Johnson, 2005 WL 1952939 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005); Bartee v. Florida, 922 So.2d
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Although all three rationales gather support from the language in Crawford,
this article will demonstrate that all three theories were incorrect interpretations of the seminal decision and missed the policy behind the Crawford
holding.137 The following sections will review these rationales one by one
and discuss whether they survived the Davis decision.

1065 (Fla. 2006); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. 2005) (“M.M.’s statement to Officer
Harrell at Jackson’s house is not testimonial in nature. When the officer arrived at Jackson’s
house, she did so in response to a ‘call for help’ and the ‘questions posed by the officer were
preliminary in nature and for the purpose of attending to M.M.’s medical concerns.”); Talley v.
State, 2005 WL 387443, *3 (Ky. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (“A 911 call does not implicate the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” and is therefore “not a testimonial
statement.”); State v. Jefferson, 922 So.2d 577, 598 (La. 2005) (agreeing with the Supreme Court
of Minnesota that “it would be an exceptional occasion with a statement made by a caller during
the course of a 911 call would be classified as testimonial.”); State v. Mann, 2005 WL 2714531,
*4 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Statements made on a 911 tape are not made under ‘circumstances
that would cause a reasonable witness to believe they could be used at trial’”); Salt Lake City v.
Williams, 128 P.3d 47, 53-54 (Utah 2005) (finding that statement made to a 911 dispatcher was
nontestimonial because it was “made while the incident was occurring and during a call placed to
911 for the purpose of seeking protection from immediate danger.”); Hammon v. Indiana, 829
N.E.2d 444, 458 (Ind. 2005) (“Officer Mooney, responding to a reported emergency, was
principally in the process of accomplishing the preliminary task of securing and assessing the
scene. Amy’s motivation was to convey basic facts and there was no suggestion that Amy wanted
her initial responses to be preserved or otherwise used against her husband at trial”). In addition,
the following non-domestic violence cases are included in the chart because their reasoning fits
within the mold of the domestic violence reasoning and provides precedent. See State v. Greene,
874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005)
[W]here a victim contacts a police officer immediately following a criminal incident to
report a possible injury and the officer receives information or asks questions to ensure
that the victim receives proper medial attention and that the crime scene is properly
secured, the victim’s statements are not testimonial in nature because “they can be
seen as part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as part of the prosecution that
follows.”
Id.; South Carolina v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 785 (S.C. 2005) (considering post-Crawford
domestic violence cases for definitions of testimonial).
137. Crawford provides three possible definitions of core “testimonial” rights:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially,” “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
“testimonial” materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions,” “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial[.]” These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise
articulation, some statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte
testimony at a preliminary hearing.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
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V. FORMALITY RATIONALE CASES WERE WRONGLY DECIDED
UNDER CRAWFORD
Many courts interpreted Crawford to apply Sixth Amendment protections only to formal police questioning and not to informal statements given
to police.138 These decisions permitted the police to recite what the alleged
victim told them under the excited utterance exception without the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, holding that this informal type of
hearsay was not “testimonial” and therefore there was no right to confront
the declarant.139
Hammon v. Indiana, the case reversed by the Supreme Court in Davis
v. Washington, was one of the early and influential decisions that used the
formality rationale.140 Hammon’s reasoning was widely adopted by other
jurisdictions. Many jurisdictions specifically cited to the Indiana appeals
court decision,141 while other jurisdictions used the same formality logic.142

138. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska 2005) (“We have reviewed
numerous decisions which have interpreted Crawford. The great majority of courts which have
considered this question have concluded that an excited utterance by a crime victim to a police
officer, made in response to minimal questioning, is not ‘testimonial.’”). See also State v.
Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a majority of post-Crawford
cases involving initial police-victim interactions at the scene held that the situations did not
involve interrogation and that resulting statements were not “testimonial”).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 506 (6th Cir. 2005). The
nontestimonial nature of those statements to the police was demonstrated by (1) the statements
being “made within only a few short minutes after Defendant” and his wife were involved in a
domestic dispute; (2) the “police intervention was initiated by someone within the Hadley
residence,” and not by the authorities or by the wife; (3) “when the police arrived at the residence,
Mrs. Hadley [the wife] immediately emerged and blurted out the challenged statements without
any questioning or prompting whatsoever;” and (4) “her statements were not overly detailed or
‘testimonial’ in nature but were limited to the information necessary for the police officers to
address the immediate exigencies of the situation.” Id.
140. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d by 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Hammon is sometimes
referred to as Hammon-Fowler. See, e.g., Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005).
Hammon and Fowler use the same reasoning and apply identical language in part and they were
written by the same judge (on behalf of different panels of the court) and were released the same
day. Stancil, 866 A.2d at 809 n.20.
141. The following cases cite Hammon or Fowler (two overlapping opinions of the Indiana
Supreme Court): Rogers v. State, 814 N.E.2d 695 (Ind. 2004); Beach v. State, 816 N.E.2d 57 (Ind.
2004); United States v. Webb, 2004 WL 2726100, at *3-5 (D.C. Super); State v. Alvarez, 107
P.3d 350, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302, 310 (Minn. Ct. App.
2005); People v. King, 121 P.3d 234, 239-40 (Colo. 2005); State v. Veesenmeyer, 2005 WL
623277, at *3 (Minn. App. 2005); Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 355 (Alaska 2005); Davis v.
State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2005); State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482-83 (Neb. 2005);
People v. King, 7 Misc. 3d 1028A, at *9 (N.Y. 2005); City of Akron v. Hutton, 2005 WL 1523880
(Ohio 2005); Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2005); People v. Nieves, 8 Misc. 3d
1020(A), at *2 (N.Y. 2005); State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 995 (Wash. 2005); United States v.
Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 505-06 (6th Cir. 2005).
142. See full chart in Appendix. For example:
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The facts in Hammon were that a police officer responded to a domestic
disturbance call and spoke to the alleged victim, asking if there was a
problem. When she said no, he brought her to another room, away from the
defendant where she described how the defendant had punched her and
thrown her down.143 Those statements were admitted into evidence without
the witness taking the stand because the trial judge found that the statements were admissible as excited utterances despite some time delay between the alleged incident and the time of the statement.144
The appeals court affirmed the admissibility of the statements as
excited utterances and concluded that Crawford’s new jurisprudence did not
apply to these facts. The Indiana appeals court distinguished Hammon from
Crawford by focusing on the ways in which the questioning at issue was
less formal than in Crawford.145 In Hammon, the court noted that the
Alaska: Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska 2005) (determining that an
officer’s question to the declarant of “What happened?,” did not seem to fall within
the category of formal, official, and systematic questioning” and the statement that the
defendant hit him with a pipe was therefore not testimonial);
Maine: State v. Barnes, 54 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004) (refusing to characterize a statement
as “testimonial” unless it meets a restrictive definition of interrogation as “structured
police questioning.” Nontestimonial even though declarant drove herself to police
station to report her son threatened to kill her.);
Washington: State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 995 (Wash. 2005) (“Although D.L.’s
statements were made in response to questioning by a police officer, Officer Gray’s
minimal questioning was not an ‘interrogation’ as Crawford contemplated.”).
Third Circuit: United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (Title III
wiretap recordings are not “testimonial” statements for purposes of Crawford in part
because (1) the recorded conversations neither fell within nor were analogous to any
of the specific examples of “testimonial” statements mentioned by the Crawford
Court; and (2) each of the examples referred to by the Crawford Court or the
definitions it considered entails a formality to the statement absent from the recorded
statements in Hendricks.)
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2005) (The nontestimonial nature of those statements to the police was demonstrated by (1) the
statements being made within only a few short minutes after defendant and his wife
had engaged in a domestic dispute; (2) the police intervention was initiated by
someone within the residence, and not by the authorities or by the wife herself; (3)
when the police arrived at the residence, the wife immediately emerged and blurted
out the challenged statements without any questioning or prompting whatsoever; and
(4) her statements were not overly detailed or “testimonial” in nature but were limited
to the information necessary for the police officers to address the immediate
exigencies of the situation.).
Ninth Circuit: Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 831 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining
that when police responded to 911 calls, a victim’s statements were admissible
because she “was in no way being interrogated by the police”).
143. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 947.
144. Id. at 949.
145. Id. at 952. Hammon also addressed the state-of-mind issue, but was much briefer in that
analysis. Id. at 952-53 (“An unrehearsed statement made without time for reflection or deliberation, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is ‘not testimonial’ in that such a statement, by
definition, has not been made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.”).
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interview did not take place in a police station, and instead of conducting a
lengthy, structured interview the police asked questions such as “what
happened.”146 The Indiana court concluded that statements given to police
with “minimal questioning” are not the formal interrogations encompassed
by the Crawford decision.
One can certainly follow the logic of Hammon and its progeny.
Indeed, there is something formal in the term “interrogation” as opposed to
police “questioning.” Nevertheless, the formality rationale misreads Crawford. First, it makes no sense on a policy level that a person’s right to
confront an accuser only applies if the accusations repeated in court were
initially gathered in a particular manner. In Hammon’s case, he was tried
and convicted based on out-of-court evidence, “prejudiced by evidence
which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”147 These formality cases
limited Crawford to its facts, where there was in fact a formal police interrogation, ignoring the thrust of Crawford that conveyed a sweeping change
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, the formality rationale was
specifically contradicted by other language in the Crawford opinion. The
sections below will address the faulty logic of reading a formality test into
the Crawford opinion.
A. Limiting the Confrontation Clause to statements formally taken
ignores other language in the majority opinion that indicates
that statements to police outside of the formal setting of the
police station also constitute “testimonial” statements.
B. The formality rationale misinterprets Justice Scalia’s use of
historical background to erroneously conclude that Crawford
did not prevent new abuses of the Confrontation Clause but
only abuses that were deeply rooted in history. Because the
Confrontation Clause is designed to create formality in the
manner evidence is presented to a jury, it is illogical to conclude that less formality satisfies the constitution.
C. The formality theory is in conflict with the evidentiary theory
that excited utterances are deeply rooted in this nations’
history.
A. IGNORING BROAD HINTS IN CRAWFORD’S FOOTNOTES
Crawford was self-consciously opaque about why it chose the term
“interrogation” except that the out-of-court testimony in Mr. Crawford’s
146. Id. at 952.
147. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1
Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794)).
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trial happened to come from a police interrogation. The Court flaunted the
decision’s ambiguity, writing: “Just as various definitions of ‘testimonial’
exist, one can imagine various definitions of ‘interrogation,’ and we need
not select among them in this case.”148 However, the opinion did drop an
important footnote. In footnote four, Justice Scalia gave a broad hint that
statements outside the police station are testimonial. “We use the term
‘interrogation’ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense” the
Court advises. 149
To arrive at their formality requirement, courts have had to ignore or
twist Scalia’s admonishment that the term “interrogation” is to be understood “in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”150 Instead of
dissuading Hammon from its conclusion that informal statements to police
officers fall outside of Crawford’s holding, courts have twisted the term
“colloquial” to support a formality requirement. Since the dictionary
defines “interrogation” as “[t]o examine by questioning formally or officially,” the court in Hammon concluded that the lay conception or
“colloquial sense” of “interrogation” required formality.151 In fact, the
court reasoned that lay conceptions of interrogation may be even more
formal than the dictionary definition because television shows portray
stationhouse interviews as structured formal interviews.152
It makes no sense to interpret the words “colloquial sense” to mean a
formal sense. One of the antonyms of the term “colloquial” in the dictionary is the term “formal.”153 Thus colloquial is the opposite of formal.154
This shows how far lower courts have gone to avoid having to grant
constitutional protections to criminal defendants, at least where an opinion
148. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
149. Id. at 53 (“Just as various definitions of “testimonial” exist, one can imagine various
definitions of “interrogation,” and we need not select among them in this case. Sylvia’s recorded
statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any
conceivable definition.).
150. Id.
151. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 948.
152. See id. (declaring that “a lay conception of police ‘interrogation’ bolstered by
television . . . [would encompass] an interview in a room at the stationhouse”).
153. Thesaurus.com, http://thesaurus.reference.com/browse/colloquial (last visited Nov. 20,
2007). The antonym for colloquial lists “correct” then “formal,” followed by other words. Id.
154. Most likely, the Crawford majority uses the description “colloquial sense” to distinguish
the term from the formal definition of interrogation used in Miranda jurisprudence. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 53 n.4. The police questioning at issue in Crawford was a formal, custodial interrogation.
Id. at 66. If Justice Scalia intended the term “interrogation” to be read in a formal sense, he would
not have needed to have written any description about how the term was to be interpreted. Hence,
Justice Scalia could not have meant a “colloquial” understanding of “interrogation” to be a
narrow, limited definition referring primarily to custodial or custodial-like interrogations. It
would be illogical for Justice Scalia to write that he intended the term to be interpreted in a less
technical sense if he meant it to apply to the facts of Crawford and no further.
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seems to invite them to draw their own conclusions about the meaning of
different terms.
In addition to the “colloquial sense” reference, the decision offered
another broad hint that statements given to police in less formal settings are
“testimonial” and, therefore, subject to Sixth Amendment protections. In
footnote eight, the Court wrote that White v. Illinois was “arguably in
tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination
when the proffered statement is testimonial.”155 White v. Illinois was the
only Supreme Court case to deal with the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule in the context of the Sixth Amendment, and here the Court was
calling it into question. In White, an investigating officer came to the home
of a child victim and took a statement from her that was later used in court
under the excited utterance or spontaneous declaration exception to the
hearsay rule.156 It was the very type of excited utterance exception at issue
in Hammon.157 There was nothing in the White opinion or in Crawford’s
discussion of White to suggest that the questioning in White constituted
formal police interrogation. Nothing that a court would say resembled an
inquiry before King James’s Privy Council. Not only did the interview take
place in the home, but one would expect police officers to be less formal
when questioning a child. If Crawford called White into question then formality should not determine the scope of the Confrontation Clause.
Surprisingly, the Indiana appeals court never mentioned this spontaneous
utterance footnote. Hammon and its progeny ignore Crawford’s broad hints
in footnotes four and eight that almost all statements to police constitute
“testimonial” statements and simply cherry pick the language that supports
the conclusion that informal questioning falls outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause.
B. HISTORIC APPROACH IN THE OPINION SUPPORTS EXPANSIVE
CONFRONTATION RIGHT
The formality conclusion reached by the courts was bound up with the
historical detail that pervaded the Crawford opinion. The Indiana appeals
court backed up its formal reading of the term “interrogation” in Hammon
by pointing to the other types of possible core “testimonial” statements
discussed in Crawford, much of which detailed historical abuses. For
155. Id. at 58.
156. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1992).
157. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. The only issue that White addressed is whether the Sixth
Amendment requires a declarant to be unavailable before the government is permitted to introduce
firmly rooted hearsay that would be admissible under the Roberts’ framework. White, 502 U.S. at
349.
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example, the Indiana court stated that the complainant’s “oral statement was
not given in a formal setting even remotely resembling an inquiry before
King James I’s Privy Council.”158 The Indiana appeals court read Crawford
to mean that the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with the evils
contemplated by the founders. In other words, since the Framers did not
expect anything as informal as an excited utterance to be used as the basis
for prosecuting someone in the end of the eighteenth century, then this was
not one of the evils contemplated by the Framers. However, it will be
shown that this was not how the Crawford opinion viewed new abuses of
the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford proffered three possible definitions of testimonial: (1) ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent, “such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony;” (2) extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized “testimonial” materials; and (3) statements made
under circumstances that would lead an objective witness to believe that the
statements would be available for use at a later trial.159 The first definition
used formal examples, the second was expressly formal, and only the third
definition was non-formal. The abuses described in the opinion—sworn
affidavits and depositions—are more formal because Justice Scalia was
describing the abuses prevalent in England in the eighteenth century and
earlier.160
In 1791, when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, the prosecution
would not have tried to introduce the excited utterance statements to the
police without opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, both because the
excited utterance is a newer invention and because even when hearsay was
allowed in, the conviction could not be based upon hearsay evidence.161
158. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
159. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52:
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions, statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . . These formulations
all share a common nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various
levels of abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise articulation, some
statements qualify under any definition—for example, ex parte testimony at
a preliminary hearing.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
160. Id. at 44.
161. White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). “[O]ut-of-court statements made by someone other than the accused and not
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Informal out-of-court statements were generally not introduced in early
trials as the basis upon which to convict, historians have noted.162 Hence,
these out-of-court statements at trial were not likely to be one of the evils
contemplated at the time of the founding.163
Should modern courts determine the scope of the Confrontation Clause
by what the Framers intended trials to look like, or should the scope of the
Confrontation Clause be determined by what abuses the founders were
afraid might be imposed? This lies at the heart of the disagreement over
formality requirements. If the Supreme Court intended to limit the reach of
the Sixth Amendment only to those abuses practiced in England before the
signing of the Sixth Amendment, then less formal hearsay such as excited
utterances would not be included.164 This position represents Justice
Thomas’ viewpoint, as memorialized in his 1992 concurrence in White v.
Illinois and later in his separate opinion in Davis.165 The Crawford opinion
actually took a stand on whether the Court meant to prohibit only what the
Framers knew was a threat, or whether the Clause prohibited what the
Framers would have prohibited had they known it would come to pass.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia refused to limit the Confrontation
Clause to abuses known or thought about at the time:
But even if, as he[,] [the Chief Justice,] claims, a general bar on
unsworn hearsay made application of the Confrontation Clause to
unsworn “testimonial” statements a moot point, that would merely
change our focus from direct evidence of original meaning of the
Sixth Amendment to reasonable inference. We find it implausible
that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex
parte affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly

taken under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not considered
substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.” Id.
162. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 30 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §6342, 22 n.7 (1997 & Supp. 2006).
163. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure.”); see also Mosteller, supra note 32, at 569
(“The hearsay rule of that time did not have the ready exceptions available today.”).
164. See Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” In The Confrontation Clause: Crawford v.
Washington, Noah Webster, And Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 182 (2006)
(rejecting Crawford’s “dubious” assertion that the Confrontation Clause “is most naturally read as
a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding” (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 (2004)).
165. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (1992) (Thomas, J. concurring in part); see also Davis v.
Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2281-82 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Note that in Crawford, the second possible core definition (out of three possible core
definitions) sets forth Justice Thomas’ definition: “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
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OK. Any attempt to determine the application of a constitutional
provision to a phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its
adoption (here, allegedly, admissible unsworn testimony) involves
some degree of estimation--what [the Chief Justice] calls use of a
“proxy,” post, at 1375--but that is hardly a reason not to make the
estimation as accurate as possible. Even if, as [the Chief Justice]
mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how the Sixth
Amendment originally applied to unsworn testimony, there is no
doubt what its application would have been.166
This quotation from Crawford lays to rest any doubt that the majority
intended the Confrontation Clause to bar hearsay that was too informal to
have been admissible in common law England.167 The Framers would have
focused on unsworn testimony as the Chief Justice noted in his dissent,
since unsworn testimony was not permitted even in the civil-law ex parte
examinations of England, the primary horrors that the Framers addressed by
the Clause.168 In this quotation, Justice Scalia explained that whether the
government introduced or did not introduce unsworn statements during the
founding era was immaterial to the question of the scope of the Confrontation Clause.169 The question should be what the application of the clause
would have been at the time of the founders. Thus, although the formality
language derived from the formal abuses described possible definitions of
testimonial statements, the notion that the clause is only interested in abuses
perpetrated in the past flies in the face of this specific reasoning in
Crawford.
There is little doubt that a government official who tried to introduce
an unsworn, unwritten statement into a trial based on the witness being
excited by an event, would have found that the Confrontation Clause barred
the statement. Again we see the lower courts cherry picking the language
that supports their conclusion and ignoring the reasoning within the
Crawford decision.
C. THE NOTION THAT EXCITED UTTERANCES ARE TOO RECENT TO
CONSTITUTE HISTORIC ABUSES CONTRADICTS THE EVIDENTIARY
THEORY OF DEEPLY ROOTED HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Reading Crawford as only prohibiting historic abuses creates an
unintended irony in the area of excited utterances. The formality rationale
166.
167.
168.
169.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 70; Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3.
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excludes excited utterances from the scope of testimonial evidence because
excited utterances are not deemed deeply rooted enough to qualify as the
abuses with which the founders were concerned. Before Crawford, courts
admitted excited utterances precisely because they were viewed as “deeply
rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rules.170 “Deeply rooted” exceptions
were deemed inherently reliable under Roberts’ reasoning, and therefore
admissible without face-to-face confrontation. Under Roberts, courts need
not question the specific reliability of these statements once a trial judge
qualified them as excited utterances.171 For example, the Supreme Court of
Washington in Davis noted approvingly, “the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court properly classified the 911 call as an excited utterance, which is a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule and thus satisfies the requirement of reliability.”172 By firmly rooted, the Washington Supreme Court
meant that it had historical roots.173 Hence, excited utterances are deeply
rooted under evidence law, but not rooted enough to be deemed “testimonial” by courts that side with Justice Thomas’ view of the clause that it
should only apply to abuses contemplated by the Framers of the Sixth
Amendment.174
Thanks to dicta in Crawford, courts are now recognizing that the
excited utterance exception has expanded so much that it cannot really be
considered deeply rooted. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Stancil v. United States was concerned with “the apparent expansion in
recent years of the kinds of statements which fall under the rubric of the
hearsay exception for excited utterances.”175 The District of Columbia
170. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004)
(holding that hearsay statement made at the hospital to police that defendant had cut him was not
“testimonial” because the interview was unstructured, informal, and unrecorded). “The hearsay
exception for spontaneous statements is firmly rooted.” Id. at 851 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 355,
n.8 (1992)); see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (citing the excited utterance as an
example of such trustworthy hearsay).
171. White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8.
172. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005).
173. Id.; see also White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8 (“There can be no doubt that the two exceptions
we consider in this case are ‘firmly rooted.’ The exception for spontaneous declarations is at least
two centuries old.”).
174. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); White,
502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
175. Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005). Note that Stancil was vacated
for rehearing. In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186, 1187 (D.C. 2005).
[T]he majority of the judges of this court has voted to grant the petition for rehearing
en banc, it is FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc in
appeal no. 03-CM-444 is granted. It is FURTHER ORDERED, sua sponte, that
appeal no. 03-CM-605, which was argued before a division on June 7, 2005, is hereby
consolidated with appeal no. 03- CM-444, for argument and the Clerk shall schedule
these matters for argument in tandem before the court sitting en banc for the month of
October.
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Court of Appeals wrote that historically, excited utterance statements were
admissible if they were “practically reflex actions . . . or images of the
contents of the brain . . . likely to be made without any calculation as to
their potential effect and without regard to their possible consequences.”176
Historically, Stancil noted that the statement must be contemporaneous with
the startling event and would not have included responses to police
questioning.177 This does not mean that courts such as Stancil wish to
rethink admitting these hearsay statements as excited utterances. Rather,
the lower courts wish to use this fact against the criminal defendants since it
follows that excited utterances would not have been the abuses the founders
had in mind when they adopted the Confrontation Clause. Ironies aside, the
fact that the excited utterance is not deeply rooted cuts two ways. That
certain hearsay evidence was not admitted in the years after the Sixth
Amendment was ratified is a fairly good indicator that the Confrontation
Clause barred that type of evidence, or at least indicates that the Framers
would have found it objectionable to substitute excited out-of-court
statements for sworn in-court testimony.
The appellant’s brief in Davis argued that there was no excited
utterance exception in the Framers’ time, there was only res gestae; as soon
as the statement became descriptive of something that happened in the past,
it fell outside of the exception.178 Davis’ appellate brief to the Supreme
Court described the “hue and cry” of victims to local constables or bailiffs
as the forerunners of 911 calls.179 Davis’ appellants argued that the fact that
the evidence rules precluded “hue and cry” evidence from getting before the
jury proved that the Confrontation Clause applied to these early oral
accusations.180 Since the Framers interpreted the Sixth Amendment as
precluding “hue and cry” evidence, Davis argued, this Court must likewise

Id. As this article went to press no further action was taken.
176. Stancil, 866 A.2d at 811.
177. Id. (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep 179 (K.B. 1694); Packet Co.
v. Clough, 87 U.S. 528, 542 (1874)).
178. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 23-24. Note that the brief does not state the source
of this assertion. Id. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, n.8 (2004) (citing Thompson, 90
Eng. Rep.). Note that Thompson was a civil case, so the clause was not an issue.
179. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 23-24 (citing 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA
PLACITORUM CORONAE: A HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98-100 (1st Am. ed. 1847)).
180. See Graham, The Right to Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One , 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 104 (1972) (“[T]he Court never made clear when it
relied on the common-law hearsay rule and when its decision was based on the constitutional right
of confrontation” before the right was held binding on the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment (until the Supreme Court made the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
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hold that the Sixth Amendment precludes the modern day hue and cry,
namely, the 911 call and other oral statements to police.
If Crawford is understood to return our courts to a system of live
testimony rather than repeated statements, then the historical recency of this
hearsay exception actually negates the argument that formality is key to
whether evidence is “testimonial.” As scholar Richard Friedman argues,
the Framers wanted formality when they required that witnesses take the
stand and answer questions under oath.181 In his Supreme Court brief in
Hammon, Friedman argued that this history of formality requirements at the
time of the founding of this country means that courts misinterpret
Crawford when they read a formality requirement into the definition of
“testimonial.”182
It is impossible to square this seminal decision with the restrictive
formality requirement imposed by so many lower courts that construed
Crawford. By selectively choosing language that suggests formality, lower
courts turn a blind eye to the irony in holding that the Confrontation Clause
welcomes informal out-of-court statements to substitute for live witnesses
who answer questions under oath based on the fact that such a trial by
hearsay accusation would never have occurred to the Framers.
D. DOES FORMALITY SURVIVE THE SUPREME COURT ’S DAVIS
DECISION?
This section set forth several reasons why Crawford should not be read
to limit the term testimonial to formal statements. If unsworn statements
are as bad, if not worse, as sworn statements, how can formality be a factor
in determining whether a statement is testimonial? Such a reading ignores
footnote four where the Court uses the term “colloquial” to describe the
type of interrogation it envisions, and most importantly, it ignores the edict
to construe the Sixth Amendment so that it conforms to what the Framers
would have thought had the evidence been introduced were they transported
into the future.183 There is positively no evidence that the Framers
preferred informal evidence over formal evidence; on the contrary, there is
evidence that formal evidence was preferred for witnesses testifying against
181. As scholar Richard Friedman argued, what history is known suggests that the Framers
valued formality when they required that witness take the stand and answer questions under oath.
Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 24, at 1025; Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the
Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 269 (2005) [hereinafter Friedman,
Grappling] (“Formality is an ideal, an aspect of testimony given in the optimal way.”).
182. See Friedman, Grappling, supra note 181, at 269.
183. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3 (looking at what “application” of the Clause “would
have been” had an issue arisen at the time of the founding of this country and not “how the Sixth
Amendment originally applied.”).
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a defendant. In truth, the formality prong established in Davis contradicts
Crawford’s broad mandate for accusers to come to court where the factfinder may judge the credibility and relevance of the evidence by observing
the witness testify.184
Davis is confusing because it both adopts formality and rejects it. The
Supreme Court appeared to have rejected formality for it reversed Hammon
v. Indiana, a lower court decision built primarily upon the formality framework.185 The Court decided that the statements made by the complaining
witness in Hammon were “testimonial” even though they took place at a
kitchen table rather than at a police station and even though they were not
recorded.186 Although the police officer did not use structured questioning
in Hammon, Davis held that Mrs. Hammon’s statements were “testimonial.”187 On the other hand, it would be premature to assert that Justice
Thomas’ formality viewpoint is dead. Despite reversing Hammon, the
Supreme Court presents formality as one criterion it considered when
differentiating the statements in Davis v. Washington from those in
Crawford.188 Comparing the demeanor of the absent witness in Davis, Ms.
McCottry, to the demeanor of the absent witness in Crawford at the time
they initially made their statements against their significant others, the
Court draws a connection between their demeanor and the formality of the
questioning.
Finally, the difference in the level of formality is striking.
Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house, with an
officer-interrogator taping and taking notes, while McCottry’s
frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment
that was not tranquil, or even safe. Thus, the circumstances of her
interrogation objectively indicate that its primary purpose was to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.189
Formality lives on as a prong upon which to compare testimonial with
nontestimonial statements. The less formal the statement, the more likely
that its primary purpose was to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. As you can see from the quotation above, the formality in Davis is
184. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004)
185. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
186. Id. at 2273.
187. Id. at 2275.
188. Id. at 2278 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial
utterance.”) Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Supreme Court denied that formality was
essential to returning the Confrontation Clause to its original meaning. Id. at 2276. “But the
English cases that were the progenitors of the Confrontation Clause did not limit the exclusionary
rule to prior court testimony and formal depositions.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
189. Id. at 2269.
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intertwined with the demeanor of the witness. The same frantic nature that
qualified the statement as an excited utterance now qualified it as a nontestimonial utterance. This makes it possible for lower courts to conclude that
virtually all excited utterances fall outside the scope of the confrontation
right.190
Davis is also inconsistent in how it evaluates how formal police officers or police agents were in gathering testimony. The statements in Davis
that the Court deemed nontestimonial were in fact more formal than those
in Hammon that the Court deemed testimonial. In Davis, the statements at
issue were recorded while in Hammon the statements were not recorded. It
was not even clear whether the officer in Hammon took notes while gathering the statements.191 Although the operator in Davis asked a multitude of
questions to obtain the statements at issue, it is not clear that the officers in
Hammon asked anything beyond a simple “what happened?”192 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court gave weight to the informal nature of the
questioning in Davis while rejecting the relevance of the informal nature of
the questioning in Hammon.193
By creating confusion in Davis over the role of formality in
determining the application of the Confrontation Clause the Supreme Court
creates an opportunity for lower courts to continue to apply the formality
prong in a manner that helps them reach the result they wish. We have seen
how the ambiguity in Crawford over formality was used to restrict the
scope of the Confrontation Clause. Again, after Davis, we can expect
courts to continue to use formality as a rationale for distinguishing future
statements from those in Crawford and Hammon. While it no longer will
be the sole basis for denying confrontation rights, formality will continue to
be a method for lower courts to conclude that statements are not
testimonial.194
Formality was created by the lower courts to distinguish the facts in
Crawford from other fact patterns. These lower courts wrongly decided,
missing the policy behind Crawford for extending confrontation rights to
modern day trials. Davis then adopted this language in its reasoning.
Hence, we see the dragging effect that the state courts had on the Supreme

190. See infra note 198 and accompanying text (“Some early cases interpreted Crawford as
excluding all excited utterances from. . .”).
191. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2275.
192. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005).
193. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2268, 2275.
194. See, e.g., State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 275 (Or. 2006) (“Finally, we consider the
‘level of formality’ of the 9-1-1 call. Here, as in Davis, Carders answers to the 9-1-1 operator’s
initial questions were ‘frantic.’”).
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Court. Even though Hammon was reversed, the formality rationale lives on
to prevent future defendants from being able to face their accusers in
court.195
VI. “STATE-OF-MIND OF THE SPEAKER” RATIONALE CASES ARE
WRONGLY DECIDED UNDER CRAWFORD
Another rationale post-Crawford cases employed to deny confrontation
rights is the state-of-mind test. These cases examined the state-of-mind of
the person making the statement at the time it was uttered limiting
“testimonial” statements to those statements where the speakers intended to
bear witness. To be deemed “testimonial” and for the Confrontation Clause
to apply, the speaker had to have contemplated that his words will be used
in a future trial. 196
This state-of-mind test for deciding post-Crawford domestic violence
cases is particularly widespread in appeals regarding the admission of 911
calls.197 In Washington v. Davis,198 the case affirmed by the Supreme
Court, the caller hung up and the 911 operator called back and asked the
witness a series of questions starting with the last name and then the first
name of the person who had assaulted the caller.199 On appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the telephone calls must be
“scrutinized to determine whether it is a call for help to be rescued from
peril or is generated by a desire to bear witness.”200 While some of the later
questions and answers were “testimonial,” the Washington high court held
that it was proper to admit the most important aspect of the call in Davis,
the identification of the defendant as being in her home, thereby
establishing a violation of a restraining order against him.
195. This point will be developed in Section VII.A infra.
196. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 469 (2004).
197. See, e.g., New York v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. 2004).
A 911 call was typically initiated by the victim of a crime. It was generated not by the
desire of the prosecution or the police to seek evidence against a particular suspect;
rather, the 911 call had its genesis in the urgent desire of a citizen to be rescued from
immediate peril.
Id.; Moscat has been followed by many other jurisdictions: State v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574,
590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (including long list of cases that allow 911 calls); United States v.
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3rd Cir. 2005). “[S]tatements made during the 911 call neither fall
within nor are analogous to any of the specific examples of testimonial statements mentioned in
Crawford. Emergency calls are nontestimonial absent ‘exceptional circumstances’ where there is
‘specific information bearing upon the caller’s motive to bear testimony.” Id. at 361-62, n.4.
198. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), aff’d by Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006).
199. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 79, at 5.
200. Davis, 111 P.3d at 849. Cf. Washington v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004) (stating that a 911 call is “testimonial”).
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Even though an emergency 911 call may assist police in
investigation or assist the State in prosecution, where the call is
not undertaken for those purposes, it does not resemble the
specific type of out-of-court statement with which the Sixth
Amendment is concerned.201
Brushing aside the argument that the caller “reasonably knew her 911 call
would later be used to prosecute Davis,” the Davis court puts the burden on
the defense to prove actual intent, concluding that “there is no evidence that
McCottry [the caller] had such knowledge or that it influenced her decision.”202 Hence, even though the assault in Davis was completed and the
caller specifically declined an ambulance or other aid, the high Court
defined the out-of-court statement as a call for help, falling outside the purview of the Confrontation Clause.203 This “state-of-mind of the witness”
test threatened to exclude all excited utterances from Sixth Amendment
protection because excited utterances are by definition made without
opportunity for the speaker to reflect.204 As one early California opinion
stated: “Moreover, it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which
a . . . spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial’ . . . . [S]tatements made
without reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their

201. Davis, 111 P.3d at 849 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 850.
203. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006)
(No. 05-5224) (giving the facts of declining an aid car and that defendant had just left). Many
courts have concluded that a hearsay statement made in a 911 call is not “testimonial,” because the
statement is not made in response to police questioning, and because the purpose of the call is to
obtain assistance, not to make a record against someone. See Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 587-90;
State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. App. 2004); Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776. But
see Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d 693, 699 (Fla. 2004) (“A statement is more likely to have been
made with the expectation that it would be used as evidence if it was given in response to
questioning by a government official than it would if it had been volunteered.”). The reasoning in
Lopez shows how many assumptions lower courts are making about how men and women’s
thought processes. Courts could easily have concluded the reverse, namely that someone who
dials the police must intend for the police to become involved while someone questioned by the
police at the scene of a crime might simply be trying to deflect police interest in them.
204. Some early cases interpreted Crawford as excluding all excited utterances from the term
“testimonial.” E.g., State v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. 2004).
The 911 call—usually, a hurried and panicked conversation between an injured victim
and a police telephone operator—is simply not equivalent to a formal pretrial
examination by a justice of the peace in Reformation England. If anything, it is the
electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for help. The Confrontation Clause
was not directed at such a cry.
Id. See also Ohio v. Cananday, 2005 WL 736583 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding Crawford did
not apply to excited utterances, but rather only applies to hearsay statements that are not subject to
common-law exceptions).
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‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.”205 The state-of-mind theory is also not
exclusively used in 911 cases.206
Hammon flirted with the idea of ruling that all excited utterances are
nontestimonial as a matter of law:
We further note that the very concept of an “excited utterance” is
such that it is difficult to perceive how such a statement could ever
be “testimonial.” The underlying rationale of the excited utterance
exception is that such a declaration from one who has recently
suffered an overpowering experience is likely to be truthful.207
One problem with the state-of-mind test is that it has been built upon the
excited utterance, which is a legal fiction that requires judges to make
findings that nobody takes literally. The speaker does not have the capacity
to formulate a lie because the shock “stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control.” 208
Consider how similar the state-of-mind test is to the excited utterance
test. Under the excited utterance exception, trial judges were determining
that speakers were making statements while under the shock of the event;
now judges also have to also ask if the speakers who were overcome by
traumatic events are likely to have known at the time they spoke to police
that their words will be used against the person they have accused. Judges
have already answered the second question when they decided the statements constituted an excited utterance.209 “Their demonstrated emotional
distress—the very quality that justified the admission of their statements as
excited utterances—is inconsistent with a determination that they were
made with a belief that such statements ‘would be available for use later at

205. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 469. “Mrs. Corella’s statements were ultimately used in a
criminal prosecution, but statements made without reflection or deliberation are not made in
contemplation of their ‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.” Id.
206. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (placing less emphasis
on state-of-mind than formality); State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005) (regarding a
non-domestic shooting, the Connecticut court concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances of the
present matter, we conclude that an objective witness reasonably would not believe that the
statements would be available for use at a later trial”).
207. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 952 (citing Hardiman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.
2000)).
208. 6 JAMES H. CHADBURN, EVIDENCE ON TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1747 (Chadburn
rev. 1976).
209. See State v. Byrd, 828 N.E.2d 133, 136-37 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
All of the foundational requirements for admission of this 911 call as an excited
utterance were satisfied in the present case: the existence of a startling or shocking
event, the declarant’s possessing firsthand knowledge of that event and being under
the stress or excitement caused by the event when her statement was made, and the
declarant’s statement that relates to that startling event.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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trial.’”210 Both the objective and subjective state-of-mind standard invites
the government to build upon the excited utterance myth. A reasonable
woman still under the influence of the overpowering event will not be
found to have been motivated by a desire to prosecute. If the first step is
wrong as a matter of science, psychology and logic, then why should the
court build on it by creating a state-of-mind exception? Nor should readers
console themselves with the fact that most courts apply a case-by-case test
instead of a per se rule towards excited utterances.
Most courts, including the jurisdictions that decided Hammon and
Davis, rejected the conclusion that all excited utterances are by definition
nontestimonial in favor of a case-by-case approach to determine from the
circumstances of the statements to authorities whether the speaker of the
excited utterance would reasonably have contemplated the use of the statement to prosecute the defendant at the time it was made.211 The case-bycase approach still resulted in the exclusion of most, if not all excited
utterance statements from the clause.212 Judges that admit the statements as
excited utterances have already determined that the statement was “made
while still under the stress of excitement from the startling event” and
“made without time for reflection or deliberation.”213 As the early
California case of People v. Corella reasoned, “statements made without
reflection or deliberation are not made in contemplation of their ‘testimonial’ use in a future trial.”214 The state-of-mind fiction will be applied
210. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d by 701
N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005) (discussing an officer who responds to a 911 call and interviews
two female victims for half an hour, which the court held was not “testimonial”).
211. Id. Interestingly, public defenders O’Toole and Easterly observe that in “all but one of
the 8 cases in which the Court GVR’d [granted certiorari, vacated judgment and remanded for
further proceedings when the Court decided Davis] the lower courts had improperly relied upon to
some extent, the ‘excited’ emotional state of the witness when making the statement in order to
find that the right was not triggered.” See Timothy O’Toole & Catharine Easterly, Davis v.
Washington: Confrontation Wins the Day, THE CHAMPION 20, 34 (Mar. 2007).
212. Salt Lake City v. Williams, 128 P.3d 47 (Utah 2005) (“Other courts have concluded that
the inquiry into whether statements made during a 911 call are ‘testimonial must be made on a
case-by-case basis.”); United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2005) (illustrating a nondomestic violence case where a 911 call was nontestimonial because “the circumstances that made
the anonymous 911 call an excited utterance were significant enough to overwhelm the caller’s
capacity to appreciate the potential long-range use of her words”); New York v. Moscat, 777
N.Y.S.2d 875, 878-80 (N.Y. 2004); Campos v. Texas, 186 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Tex. 2005).
213. E.g., State v. Mann, 2005 WL 2714531, at *1 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The ‘excited
utterance’ exception to the hearsay rule is based upon the theory that the declarant’s statements
must be true because the declarant, caught up in a startling event, lacks ‘the capacity of reflection,
thereby producing utterances free of conscious fabrication.’”). Later, when the court considers the
Confrontation Clause, the court reasons, “[d]uring the initial portion of the 911 tape, Ashley was
screaming and crying. Her statements are readily distinguishable from those at issue in
Crawford.” Id. at *4.
214. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App 4th 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also State v.
Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005) (approving the Corella decision).
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by the same judges that have first determined that statements were made
before the senses have stilled, despite the fact that science fails to support
their conclusions. It is hardly the principled rule envisioned by Crawford
when it rejected Roberts in favor of a test more in keeping with the
Framers’ intent.
A. THE TEST DERIVES FROM A MISREADING OF CRAWFORD’S THIRD
POSSIBLE CORE DEFINITION
Ironically, the theory that the state-of-mind of the speaker should guide
a court in determining whether a statement is “testimonial” was a broad
theory of confrontation now being employed by the courts as a rationale to
narrow the Confrontation Clause below what Crawford defines as a
minimum. The state-of-mind formulation was intended to expand the
statements at issue beyond those given to police officers, not to exclude
statements to police officers from Sixth Amendment coverage.215 The
state-of-mind of the speaker should not matter in a situation such as Davis
or Hammon when statements were made in response to police questions,
just as the state-of-mind of Ms. Crawford was immaterial to the determination of whether the clause applied to her incriminating statements.216
The state-of-mind of the speaker analysis was introduced by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) in their
Supreme Court amicus brief to encourage the Court to expand “testimonial”
statements beyond those given to police officers.217 The brief was then
quoted in Crawford where Justice Scalia wrote that at least three
formulations of core classes of “testimonial” exist, including “statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness

215. See Brief for The Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner 25, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2003) (No. 02-9410) (discussed
in following paragraph) [hereinafter NACDL Brief, Crawford] (“And calls to 911 call for some
judgment in the application of the testimonial approach. That is because 911 serves a dual role in
our society. It is both a component of our law enforcement system (suggesting that statement to
911 are testimonial) and an emergency response system (suggesting that statement to 911 are not
testimonial); see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 82, at 1240-41 (“If a statement is made
in circumstances in which a reasonable person would realize that it likely would be used in
investigation or prosecution of a crime, then the statement would be deemed testimonial.”). The
authors show how this applies to exclude many 911 calls. Id. at 1242-43.
216. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53; see Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2271 (2006)
(involving a 911 operator who asked multiple questions); Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005) (involving a police officer who asked “what happened?”).
217. NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 215, at 3.
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reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.”218
Many courts, such as the Washington appeals court in Washington v.
Davis, employed a subjective rather than an objective state-of-mind test. 219
That formulation is at odds with the “objective witness” language in
Crawford set forth in the above quotation. A subjective approach creates a
notably difficult burden where the witness in question is not in court to
testify to his or her state-of-mind, which is per force the situation in all
these cases. One wonders how defense counsel might be expected to prove
what a missing witness actually knew or intended and what the witness’
motivations were at the time the statement was made.220
Some courts have read the state-of-mind exception to mean that it is
not enough that the speaker made statements to police knowing that they
might cause the arrest of the alleged perpetrator; she or he must also believe
that the statements will be used at trial.221 However, turning to the source,
the NACDL brief uses the phrase “available for use at a later trial”
synonymously with these other phrases: “will lead the State to punish the
accused person,” “condemn the accused as a criminal and restrain his or her
liberty” and the statement was “aimed at law enforcement.”222 A more
common sense question, and one in keeping with its genesis in the NACDL
brief, is whether it is reasonable to expect that the information will be used
against the accused in some way by law enforcement. Here is a quote from
the NACDL brief:
By and large statements made to law enforcement officials about a
crime will be “testimonial.” And by and large, statements made to
friends, relatives, accomplices or any outside of criminal justice
system will not be “testimonial.” There will be exceptions to these
broad and general rules, of course. A witness to a crime may make
a statement to a friend knowing that the friend will subsequently

218. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. The NACDL brief itself uses various formulations of the
notation that statements will be used to help prosecute including the form Justice Scalia inserts
into the majority opinion. See NACDL brief, supra note 215, at 24-25.
219. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849-50 (Wash. 2005); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833
N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005).
220. Friedman, Grappling, supra note 181, at 253. Friedman has argued strenuously that the
test should be objective, not subjective. Id.
221. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2004)
(“No reasonable person in John’s shoes would have expected his statements to Dr. Russell to be
used prosecutorially, at defendant’s trial. This is true even if he thought the doctor might relay his
statements to the police.”).
222. NACDL Brief, Crawford, supra note 215, at 24-25.
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contact police. Such a statement is aimed at law enforcement and
would therefore be “testimonial.”223
As we see, NACDL did not intend to restrict the Confrontation Clause
where statements were made to government officials. NACDL’s state-ofmind theory broadens the reach of the Sixth Amendment beyond statements
to law enforcement personnel to certain private conversations aimed at law
enforcement.
In adopting the NACDL proposal as one of its three possible
definitions of “testimonial,” the Crawford majority was expanding the
application of the clause, not narrowing it. Crawford could not possibly
have intended such a restrictive reading of “testimonial.” A narrow reading
would conflict with footnote eight where Crawford questioned the admission of the excited utterance in White v. Illinois without confrontation even
though the statement was made by a four-year old child.224 The Supreme
Court could not have meant that a reasonable four-year-old would have
known her statement would be used in lieu of testimony at trial. The
ambiguity Crawford offered to allow an expansion of the clause beyond
statements to police officers has been fashioned into an argument to restrict
the clause so that most excited utterances made to police officers are not
covered by the Sixth Amendment. In this way, we see how the lower courts
exploited the ambiguity in Crawford to narrow its holding and to reach
certain results. The next section will show how a restricted reading would
even conflict with the holding that Sylvia Crawford’s confession was
testimonial.
B. THE SUPREME COURT NEVER ADDRESSED WHAT SYLVIA
CRAWFORD WAS THINKING
The state-of-mind test as a limit to the scope of the Confrontation
Clause does not square with the Crawford opinion because the Supreme
Court never applied the state-of-mind test to Ms. Crawford’s statement to
police. The Crawford decision labeled Sylvia Crawford’s statements
“testimonial” because they were in response to police interrogation; the
Court did not write that in speaking to the police, the defendant’s wife was
motivated by a desire to prosecute her husband nor that she knew or should
have known that her statement would come in against him at trial. Neither
does Crawford order the trial court to make these factual determinations on

223. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
224. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. Davis also reiterates that White v. Illinois is the “one
arguable exception” where testimonial statements may have been allowed into evidence under the
old framework. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2275.
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remand.225 The state-of-mind test was therefore never intended as a
limitation upon statements that were otherwise “testimonial.”
Had the Court decided the application of the clause in Crawford based
on his wife’s state-of-mind at the time she made the statement, the Court
might have come out with the opposite result. In Crawford, the police
arrested Mr. Crawford and brought his wife, Sylvia Crawford to the police
station where they gave her Miranda warnings and interviewed her twice.226
During these stationhouse interviews she gave statements to police that
helped prove that the defendant did not act in self-defense. When she made
those statements, Sylvia Crawford may not have been motivated by a desire
to give testimony against her husband nor would she reasonably know that
her statement would be used at trial against him. Rather, one might expect
that the declarant in Crawford was motivated by a desire to help herself, to
go home or to be let alone. After all, she was in custody and had been
cautioned that whatever she said could be used against her, but no one told
her that her statement could be used against the defendant.227 If she did not
intend the statements to be used in court, then under the theory used by
several courts after Crawford, they would be able to be used. Notice the
paradoxical reasoning of this state-of-mind rationale that courts use. If
interlocking confessions were used in court regularly, it would soon become
common knowledge that they could be so used. Once a reasonable witness
knows that his statement to police can be used to prosecute a coconspirator, then the interlocking confession constitutes a testimonial
statement and cannot be used.

225. Crawford was remanded to the trial court to determine what the trial court should do
given that Sylvia Crawford’s statements were improperly admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. The issue of harmless error was a possible avenue for
the lower courts, not a decision that the statement was in fact nontestimonial because Ms.
Crawford’s primary motivation in making the statement was not to help prosecute her husband.
Id. at 42 n.1.
226. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
227. In fact, even if she had been a lawyer and digested the Supreme Court’s prior opinions
on that issue, she might have thought it unlikely that her statement could be used against her
husband. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (noting that it was “highly unlikely” that
accomplice confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts); Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968) (stating that separate trials of defendants are required so that the
confession of one conspirator may not be heard by a jury considering the guilt of a coconspirator). A lay person, such as Sylvia Crawford, could hardly be expected to know that the
long-established Bruton rule was being replaced in some jurisdictions by a new “interlocking
confessions” rule that Crawford itself roundly rejected as a misinterpretation of Supreme Court
precedent. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (discussing the misreading of Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530
(1986)). Crawford also cites Bruton with approval. Id. at 57. Also note that in Crawford, Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor concurred, reasoning that Sylvia’s statement was
inadmissible under the old Robert line of cases. Id. at 71 (Rehnquist & O’Connor, C.J.J.,
concurring).
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Much has been made about the distinction between the subjective stateof-mind approach and the reasonable person test, but Ms. Crawford’s
statement loses under either test. We have just determined that Mr.
Crawford would not prevail if the Supreme Court had imposed an objective
state-of-mind approach upon Sylvia Crawford’s statements. The subjective
Confrontation Clause violation is even harder to prove than the reasonable
person approach since Ms. Crawford was not available to answer questions,
a problem courts would always encounter when dealing with statements
made by witnesses who do not appear at trial or who claim a privilege.228
Under the individual or subjective state-of-mind approach established by
Washington in Davis, a judge must determine what the missing witness
actually thought about her statement being used as testimony at trial at the
time she made the statement rather than what a reasonable person in her
position would have thought. Had Crawford applied the Washington
Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Court would likely have concluded that
“there is no evidence” that the declarant, Sylvia Crawford, knew at the time
she made the statement that her words would later be used to prosecute her
husband “or that it influenced her decision” to talk to the police.229 Thus,
the decision in Davis and other lower court applications of the state-of-mind
approach are manifestly erroneous for the approach contradicts the holding
in Crawford. Hence, had the Supreme Court employed the state-of-mind
approach as a method of limiting which statements to police are “testimonial,” Mr. Crawford might have lost. More importantly, that analysis
was never undertaken, proving that the state-of-mind test was not intended
to limit the scope of which police interrogations are testimonial.
C. DOES THE STATE-OF -MIND TEST SURVIVE THE SUPREME
COURT’S DAVIS DECISION?
This section has demonstrated that the “state-of-mind” test, which was
developed by lower courts to circumvent confrontation, was derived from a
misinterpretation of Crawford’s dicta about possible core definitions of
testimonial. It has also shown how this rationale threatened to undo most
confrontation rights because judges may often conclude as a finding of fact
that a particular declarant—or reasonable declarants in their position—did
make the statement intending it to be introduced at trial.
The Davis decision is confusing because it both rejects the state-ofmind test and embraces it. One must distinguish the state-of-mind of the
228. Sylvia Crawford claimed the marital privilege and was therefore deemed unavailable at
trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
229. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 850 (Wash. 2005).
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person making a statement from the intent of the officers in taking the
statement. While the state court decision in Davis was based on the stateof-mind of the declarant, the Supreme Court decision was based on the
intent of the officers, to wit, the primary purpose of the officers in asking
questions. Nevertheless, it would be premature to decide that the state-ofmind rationale is dead. Although the Court never uses the term “state-ofmind of the declarant” in its decision, the reasoning section discusses the
state-of-mind of the witness as if that were critical to its conclusion. In its
Davis opinion, the Supreme Court opined that the alleged victim who
phoned 911 did so “to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”230
Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned, the statements were not testimony
because “no ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek
help.” This is quintessential state-of-mind of the declarant reasoning.
Unlike Crawford where the Court proposed a state-of-mind test to expand
the concept of testimonial to statements to non-government officials, here,
the Davis Court invoked the state-of-mind of the caller as a rationale that
limits—not expands—the scope of what is testimonial.
In its reasoning, the Davis Court assumed that the caller was
undergoing an emergency because the caller told the police she was in an
emergency. The Court assumed that the assailant was still in her home
because that is what she told the police. Her accusation was deemed to be
true without the benefit of cross-examination or oath and without her
repeating the allegation before a judge. The lack of confrontation rights
rests on the dubious assumption that people who call 911 never lie about
whether there is an ongoing emergency. In other words, if a 911 caller does
not indicate he is calling 911 to seek immediate help, then the truth of his
accusation may be tested at trial through live testimony under oath subject
to cross-examination, but if calls and claims to be in danger at the time of
the call, then courts should assume this is true and his accusation need not
be tested through confrontation.
One cannot discuss the veracity of 911 callers without remembering the
Charles Stuart case. On national television, Americans heard one of the
most moving emergency calls where a white man, bleeding from the
abdomen, used his cell phone to tell the police that he and his pregnant wife
were shot by a black assailant who entered their car, killing his pregnant
wife in Boston in 1989. Later, it turned out that what he told the police in
the 911 call was false, fortunately for a particular black man who was well

230. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
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on his way to paying for this horrific crime.231 Stuart’s desperate call for
help should have reminded the Court that the Confrontation Clause was
adopted because alleged victims sometimes shade the facts or fabricate
whole lies and that the emergency response system is not protected from
misuse. Davis can be harnessed by future trial courts that wish to use the
state-of-mind of the declarant as a reason to deny the application of the
Confrontation Clause in future cases. Just as Crawford’s ambiguity was
used to limit confrontation rights, so will Davis’ ambiguity provide ammunition for limiting rights in future cases.
Again, we see the Supreme Court in Davis borrowing a rationale from
lower court decisions that was used to restrict the reach of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford introduced the state-of-mind exception as a rationale to expand the reach of the clause not to restrict it. When Davis uses the
state-of-mind exception to restrict the scope of the clause so that statements
to police officers are not covered, then it is not following Crawford. In fact,
such a limited state-of-mind test contradicts Crawford’s holding as well as
its reasoning. Thus, the Supreme Court’s broad vision seems to be shrinking with the help of the resistance from domestic violence decisions from
lower courts.
VII. “INTENT OF THE OFFICERS” RATIONALE CASES ARE
WRONGLY DECIDED UNDER CRAWFORD
The primary holding in Washington v. Davis is that what is testimonial
turns upon the intent of the police officers and agents of the police in taking
the statements. Before Davis, many state courts used the formality rationale
and many courts used the state-of-mind of the declarant rationale to permit
witnessless prosecutions in domestic violence cases, but a few other courts
looked at the reasons the officer took the out-of-court statement.232 This

231. This is the case of alleged victim Charles Stuart, whose brother Michael Stuart,
ultimately revealed that there was no black assailant. Sean P. Murphy, Stuart Murders Bedevil
Bennett, Still in Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1990, at A1. Michael revealed that Charles
Stuart killed his own wife and Michael helped by wounding his brother Charles to make the
unknown assailant accusation more believable. Id. The police were closing in on a particular
black male suspect, Willie Bennett, and they brought Charles Stewart to a line-up, where
coincidentally or with the help of the police, Bennett was picked out. Id.
232. See Appendix (illustrating cases that adopt the intent-of-the-officers’ rationale).
D.C.: Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. 2005); see United States v.
Webb, 2005 WL 2726100, at *4 (D.C. Super. 2005) (stating that officer’s testimony as
to the victim’s statements at the scene of the incident was nontestimonial). In Webb,
the officer’s main concerns were to investigate and to ascertain what was happening
and the victim offered the information without considering whether it could be used
later at trial. Id.
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intent-of-the-officers approach rejects the broad proposition of some
jurisdictions that only formal police station interrogations are covered by
the Confrontation Clause or that all excited utterances are nontestimonial.233
Instead, these cases carve out a middle ground where the statements to law
enforcement are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if law
enforcement gathered statements as part of an investigation of a crime and
are therefore “testimonial,” or were made during an initial phase of a response call when police were responding to emergency or medical issues
rather than investigating a crime.234 Because of its case-by-case approach,
this rationale may seem more in keeping with Crawford’s promise of more
confrontation rights but in fact, few courts interpreted Crawford to mean
that excited utterances are nontestimonial by definition. Most courts
adopted a case-by-case approach—at least in theory—regardless of whether
their analysis fell under the formality, state-of-mind or intent-of-the-officers’ rationale or some combination of the three.235 The first jurisdiction to
adopt the intent-of-the-officers approach, looking at the particular circumstances in which the statement was made, was the District of Columbia in
Stancil.236 Stancil focused on the intent of those taking the statement rather
MASSACHUSETTS: Commonweath v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 561 (Mass.
2005) (providing that statements are testimonial because on the record “[t]he questioning does not appear intended or necessary to secure a volatile scene”).
MINNESOTA: State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 2005). Trial judge held
that where officer encountered victim in the street, initial statement accusing boyfriend
was admissible but judge excluded further comments by the victim as she “went into
great detail about defendant striking her with a cooking pot, and his chasing her with a
knife while threatening to kill her.” Id. at 307, 311. The court of appeals overruled
the exclusion of later statements, holding that judge clearly erred when he concluded
they were not excited utterances. Id. at 311.
TEXAS: Key v. Texas, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (indicating that the
officer was not producing evidence in anticipation of a criminal prosecution when he
encountered the victim, but was instead responding to a call and trying to assess the
scene).
233. See, e.g., State v. Ohlson, 125 P.3d 990, 991 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (adopting a “per se
rule that excited utterances cannot be testimonial”).
234. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (rejecting the notion that all excited
utterances are nontestimonial by definition); see also Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d
549 (Mass. 2005) (leaving one important question unanswered: whether courts are creating an
intent-of-the-officers exception to the confrontation clause or actually instituting a necessity
rational akin to search and seizure exceptions); People v. Kilday, 123 Cal. App. 4th 406, 421 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (describing officers responding to a call from a hotel manager and encountering a
victim in lobby when area was unsecured and the situation uncertain).
235. The overwhelming majority of courts do not use a categorical approach to determining
the admissibility of these statements; rather, they determine whether the statements are admissible
by examining, on a case-by-case basis. E.g., Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005). Note that both domestic violence trials reviewed by the Supreme Court were decided in
favor of the government on the case by case basis, and they were litigated before police and
prosecutors had time to frame the issue in terms of the new post-Crawford requirements.
236. Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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than the state-of-mind of the person making the statement. Stancil held that
statements made to the police when they are trying to calm the situation are
nontestimonial while statements made once the police have focused on a
suspect and are in the investigation state are “testimonial.” Stancil divided
the police response into two stages. In Stage I, police secure the scene,
separating the parties and calming people down; in Stage II, police question
the participants. Massachusetts also took this approach in Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves.237 “We hold that statements made in response to questioning by
law enforcement agents are per se ‘testimonial,’ except when the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or
provide medical care.”238
The underlying facts in Stancil are exceptional in that these two stages
may truly have occurred. After all, the trial took place before Crawford,
before police had an opportunity to shade their testimony to conform to the
new jurisprudence. At the initial hearing in Stancil, the police officer
testified that when she got to the scene she saw a child with a knife who
was screaming.239 Note that these screams constitute the historic type of
excited utterance and that no one questioned the admissibility of these
statements from the child at trial or on appeal. At issue were later statements made by the girl’s mother (the alleged victim) that were admitted
into trial without benefit of cross-examination.
At the initial hearing before the trial court in Stancil, the police officer
testified that she calmed everyone down and separated them before obtaining statements. Stancil held that statements made after everyone was
calmed down and separated would be subject to Sixth Amendment requirements. Hence, one would expect that the appellate court would disallow the
mother’s statements, the accusatory statements made in Stage II when
everyone calmed down, which would reverse the conviction because these
constituted the primary evidence at trial against Mr. Stancil. Nevertheless,
the appeals court did not reverse the conviction, but remanded the case,
noting a contradiction in the testimony and allowing the trial court to
determine on remand whether or not the challenged statements actually
occurred after everyone calmed down or whether the questioning occurred
instead as part of Stage I and therefore the statements were not subject to
237. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). Unless police were involved in community caretaking or stabilizing a volatile situation, statements made to them in the
course of their investigation were “testimonial” per se and subject to exclusion in the absence of
an opportunity to cross-examine. They were not “testimonial” per se, but the trial court after
remand would have to determine whether they were in fact made with a view toward future
prosecution. Id.
238. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552.
239. Stancil, 866 A.2d at 802.

2007]

CRAWFORD’S SHORT-LIVED REVOLUTION

441

Sixth Amendment constraints.240 The appeals court found it difficult to
reconcile the officer’s testimony that the victim only talked to police “after
we got all the parties involved separated and calmed down” with testimony
elsewhere that when the officer spoke to the victim, the victim “was “shaking and crying.” The logical explanation for the disparity in testimony is
that when the officer spoke of shaking and crying, the officer was giving
the necessary incantation to convince the judge to admit the statement as an
excited utterance. But, that possibility was not addressed. The appeals
court’s reaction to the record before it illustrates the artificiality of this twostage analysis where courts can classify Stage II questioning as Stage I
questioning. Even this clear testimony that the parties were separated and
questioned was deemed subject to interpretation by a court finding a way
not to reverse a conviction.
Stancil points to how easily police may shape their testimony to make
the hearsay admissible. In remanding the case, the District of Columbia
court gave the officers a chance to explain that the alleged victim was not
yet calm and therefore that the questions and answers should constitute
Stage I statements. Under the new rule announced in Stancil, all the police
officers have to do to convince District of Columbia trial judges to allow a
statement in as nontestimonial is add a new incantation that “while the complainant was shaking and crying I asked her some questions.” The District
of Columbia court thereby created a loophole large enough to ferry most
excited utterances through.
The intent-of-the-officers cases were wrongly decided under Crawford.
The intent-of-the-officers rationale is a means of narrowing the holding in
Crawford that “at a minimum” defendants must not be tried by absent witnesses who gave their out-of-court testimony against the defendant to police
during interrogation. In trying to narrow the definition of interrogation,
these cases abrogate the third possible core definition of testimony set forth
in Crawford, namely statements made by witnesses knowing they will be
used to help prosecute.241 Thus, a person may call the police planning to
start a prosecution (core testimonial), but these courts will find the statements to be deemed nontestimonial because the police asked questions

240. Id. at 815 (remanding the case to the trial judge to determine what statements were
made within Stage I, and were therefore properly admitted in addition to what statements were
made within Stage II, and should have been excluded).
241. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (evidencing one possible core
definition of testimonial as “[s]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial”).
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intending to help that person (intent-of-the-officers).242 Given that
Crawford announced that the Confrontation Clause applied “at a minimum”
to police interrogation, lower courts are not applying Crawford’s reasoning
when they seek to limit the application of the clause by carving an
exception to the rule, an exception that threatens to swallow the rule itself,
at least for trials in domestic violence cases.
In addition, the determination of whether accusations were made
during an emergency or calm situation hardly seems a proper distinction for
whether to apply our “common-law tradition . . . of live testimony in court
subject to adversarial testing.”243 For example, Stancil’s accuser may have
been telling the complete truth to the police or may have been lying, or her
allegations may rest somewhere in-between. Traditionally, whether the
witness is telling the truth would be determined by the factfinder who
listens to the witness testify under oath. Traditionally, a defense lawyer
will cross-examine the witness in front of the jury to flesh out possible
motives for her to dissemble and to help jurors determine her credibility.
After Stancil, the jury will only have an opportunity to determine the
witness’ credibility if a trial judge decides that her statements were made
during Stage II of the police response. Of course Stage I and Stage II have
nothing to do with whether the witness was lying or whether confrontation
rights lead to better assessments of credibility. The intent of the police in
asking questions has really nothing to do with the underlying purpose of
requiring witnesses to appear in court and repeat or recant their initial
accusations.244
One problem with the intent-of-the-officers test is that it tends to
confuse the officer’s intent with the state-of-mind of the declarant, and does
so in such a way that it bypasses the original state-of-mind principle
articulated in Crawford that those that know they are implicating someone
242. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006) (giving up lip service to a
Confrontation Clause that extends beyond police interrogation).
This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation
are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were no more willing to exempt from
cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than
they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation. (Part of the evidence against
Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of
sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603).) And of course
even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not
the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.
Id. This quote is absolutely true as a principle of Sixth Amendment history but it is at odds with
the rest of the Court’s opinion because the Court never considered any other theory whereby Ms.
Davis’ incriminating statements were evaluated aside from the question of interrogation.
243. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 373-74 (1768)).
244. See Ross, supra note 4, at 162 (providing a larger discussion of this issue).
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to authorities are giving testimony.245 Another fault with the intent-of-theofficer cases is that the category does not comport with reality because
emergency systems are set up to help arrest and prosecute as well as to help
callers and police have a dual role when they respond to a scene of a
possible crime.246 As a result, the rationale invites courts to create fictions
of the term witness and testimony.247 Moreover, the rationale encourages
police to change their investigative techniques so that more information is
gathered at the emergency stages of investigation. For example, instead of
asking Mrs. Hammon to sit down before asking her what happened, police
will have this conversation on the front step.248 This alteration will help
avoid confrontation rights, the opposite goal of that expressed in
Crawford.249 The lower courts addressed in this section also failed to
implement the Supreme Court’s policy as they applied Crawford to different fact patterns. Instead, these courts sought ways to narrow Crawford’s
holding by picking out the word interrogation and ignoring the policy set
forth in the opinion of increasing confrontation beyond Crawford’s
particular factual situation of a station house interview.
A. DAVIS INVITES LOWER COURTS TO CONTINUE TO INTRODUCE OUT
OF COURT ACCUSATIONS IN PLACE OF LIVE TESTIMONY
When the Supreme Court adopted the intent-of-the-officers test in
Davis v. Washington, one could say the Court followed Stancil and
Gonzales. Crawford never focused on the intent of the officers, either
generally or in regards to the specific facts of the case. The intent-of-the-

245. Why should it matter in Stancil whether the witness was upset or calm when she spoke?
The theory seems to be that if the witness sounds upset, the officer’s intent would be different than
if the witness is not upset. Still, whether the witness was upset sounds like it goes to the state-ofmind of the declarant. Moreover, even if the declarant was upset, under the original Crawford
state-of-mind test, the statements would still be testimonial as long as the witness realized that he
or she was giving information that would likely lead to arrest or prosecution of the person he or
she accused.
246. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280, 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (providing one of Justice Thomas’ observations in Davis).
247. See Ross, supra note 4, at 174-76, 216-17.
248. See, e.g., Ohio v. Colon, 2007 WL 179082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (involving a police
officer who elicited information about what had happened while a victim was sitting on a curb
after the perpetrator had left). Statements gathered in the manner involved in Colon were deemed
nontestimonial unlike Hammon where “the police interrogation of the victim and the suspect
occurred in separate rooms.” Id. Note that the arrest in Colon occurred after Crawford was
decided, so police may have already started to shift their tactics to less formal informationgathering.
249. See Mosteller, supra note 32, at 514 (“I suggest that the path of the law’s development
will be improved if the clause read as a positive command to afford the accused the right ‘to be
confronted with the witnesses against him’ rather than principally as a negative restriction on the
admission of certain out-of-court evidence.”).
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officers test constitutes a limit on Crawford’s declaration that police interrogations are core testimonial statements. “Whatever else the term covers,
it applies at a minimum . . . to police interrogations,” the Crawford court
decreed.250 Now with Davis, this minimum has an exception. The Supreme
Court set out in Davis to clarify Crawford but ended up undercutting the
breadth of the earlier decision, both in tone and in substance.251
While Davis appeared to adopt the test posed by the small number of
courts that based admissibility on the intent-of-the officers, the decision
also referenced the other two tests described above as reasons to determine
that accusations to police are nontestimonial. In this way Davis chooses
ambiguity over bright line determinations, such as the bright line rule that
all statements made to police are testimonial. The Davis test allows many
different circumstances to influence a trial judge’s conclusion. Because of
its multiple focus, the intent-of-the-officer approach is unavoidably
malleable.252 Throughout this article, we have seen how ambiguity and
malleability end up helping the government introduce evidence without live
witnesses. The incentive to allow a trial to proceed or to affirm a conviction are great, while the interest in giving a defendant the opportunity to
confront her accuser will often take a back seat, particularly if courts presume that the defendant is guilty and that the absent witness told the truth to
police. Thus, while Davis could be read broadly to require confrontation
except in situations almost factually identical to the Davis facts,253 lower
courts are ultimately likely to end up interpreting Davis to exclude all 911
calls from Sixth Amendment protection and many statements taken at the
scene of the crime.254 Davis’ case-by-case approach is hardly the bright

250. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
251. That may seem counter-intuitive given that in reversing the Hammon decision, the
Davis Court refused to constrict the Confrontation Clause to statements taken at the police station.
However, Hammon should have been an easy case for reversal for the Indiana Courts as well as
for the Supreme Court. Like the facts in Crawford, the statements implicating Hammon were
made to a police officer after a crime was committed. The Hammon case thus fell easily within
the scope of Crawford’s broad sweeping mandate that accusers give testimony in open court.
252. See Mosteller, supra note 32, at 568 (describing how police will change their
procedures in order for evidence to become admissible at trial); see also Ross, supra note 4, at
205-06 (“The Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial use
of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that
provision. . . testimonial statements are what they are.”).
253. O’Toole & Easterly, supra note 211, at 253 (“Davis thus classifies as testimonial a huge
category of statements—all post-crime statements to law enforcement officers . . . .”).
254. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 163 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007)
(parenthetical). After Supreme Court reversed and remanded Anderson back to Alaska, 126 S. Ct.
2983, the Court again affirmed the conviction even though the questioning took place after one
officer “remained with” the defendant while the other officer went with one accuser back to her
apartment where the officer questioned the alleged victim. All these statements were deemed nontestimonial because “the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the
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line rule that the Crawford opinion declared was needed when it overruled
the Roberts’ line of cases precisely because the rules were too malleable
and allowed courts to bend the rules to allow in “testimonial” hearsay.
How malleable the case-by-case approach is, turns on the definition of
emergency. If the emergency exception applies whenever police are trying
to find out the identity of the person who committed the offense in order to
know if the police may have to deal with someone who may be a danger to
them, then the exception is broad. If it only applies when the police are not
there to protect the witness, such as when they ask questions over the
telephone, then that would be much narrower. When the Supreme Court
affirmed the Washington court, it concluded that the operator asked the last
name, first name and middle initial of the defendant in order to let police
officials “know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.”255
Davis never stated whether this inquiry was reserved for 911 calls or whether police at the scene might have questions to learn if they are encountering
a violent felon in the house or when they leave the house. After Davis,
courts do not know whether the emergency response exception includes
statements made to help arrest the person responsible for the alleged act or
whether it is narrow, including only those statements where the declarant
asserts that he is still in danger and the police are not there to protect him.
After studying the decisions that interpreted the Supreme Court’s first
ambiguous decision, Crawford v. Washington, readers will now predict that
lower courts will exploit the ambiguity in the second Supreme Court
decision to restrict confrontation rights.

interrogation was to enable police to resolve an on-going emergency.” But see State v. Wright,
701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005), vacated and remanded, Wright v. Minnesota, 126 S.Ct. 299
(2006) (illustrating a case where the Supreme Court accepted certiorari the same year as Davis and
vacated the judgment and remanded to the Supreme Court of Minnesota for further consideration
in light of Davis). On remand, the Court affirmed that two 911 calls were nontestimonial but held
that the statements at the scene were testimonial under Davis because they were made after the
defendant was already in custody. Id. at 474, 476. The Court remanded the case so that lower
courts could determine whether the client had forfeited his right of confrontation by procuring the
witnesses’ unavailability. Id. at 482.
255. Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. at 2276. This is the full third prong differentiating the
two statements:
Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively,
was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present
emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the
past. That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the identity of the assailant,
so that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering a
violent felon.
Id.; see, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 186
(2004) (“Officers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are
dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible
danger to the potential victim.”).
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B. POST-DAVIS DECISIONS
Indeed, many courts have interpreted Davis broadly. In the 911
context, Davis relied on the fact that the abuser was in the home at the time
of the call,256 but lower courts after Davis have decided that 911 calls where
the alleged abuser is no longer in the same location as the caller are also
beyond the scope of the Confrontation Clause.257 The lower courts are also
expanding Davis’ intent-of-the-officers rationale to conclude that statements made at the scene are beyond the scope of the Confrontation
Clause.258 Many lower courts permit on-cite interviews with police. Some
cases hold that the fact that the assailant was not present at the scene means
that the evidence is nontestimonial.259 Conversely, some cases hold that the
fact that the assailant was present means that the evidence is
nontestimonial.260

256. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). “In this case, for example, after the
operator gained the information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency
appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises) . . . . It could be readily
maintained that, from that point on, McCottry’s statements were testimonial.” Id.
257. In fact, courts have also decided that 911 calls where the alleged abuser was no longer
in the same location as the caller are beyond the Confrontation Clause’s scope. See, e.g., State v.
Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 274-75 (Or. 2006) (involving a 911 call where the caller “explained that
her ‘boyfriend’ hit her but that he since left the house”). Camerana held that the 911 call was
nontestimonial because, “although Carder was referring to ‘past’ events, the danger of a renewal
of the domestic assault had not necessarily or fully abated. Defendant had just left; he could
easily have returned before the police could arrive.” See also Ohio v. Colon, 2007 WL 179082
(Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (finding that statements were nontestimonial even though police were at the
scene and defendant had left because “the defendant had just fled the scene and not been secured
by police.”); People v. Brenn, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (involving an
accuser who left the home after the alleged crime and called the police from a neighbor’s home
and told operator he wanted to press charges, which the court held were not testimonial in part
because the statements were made “in rapid-fire questioning from dispatcher”).
258. E.g., People v. Bradley. 862 N.E.2d 79, 81 (N.Y. 2006). Only testimony introduced at
trial that defendant through the victim through a glass door was police officer repeating statement
made by the victim at the scene. The police officer testified he responded to a 911 call and asked
the victim “what happened” at the door of the apartment. Id. Accusation against the defendant
was nontestimonial because “Asking Dison ‘what happened’ was a normal and appropriate way to
begin” the task of finding out what had caused the injuries so that he could decide what, if any,
action was necessary to prevent further harm.” Id.
259. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2007) (indicating that
statements at scene are admissible because “the assailant was still at large” unlike Hammon where
he was in the home with the police).
260. E.g., State v. Vinson, 221 S.W. 256, 265-66 (Tex. 2007). In Vinson, the statement at
scene answering questions nontestimonial because, “[f]irst, [the missing witness] ‘was present
during the making of all of [the accuser’s] remaining statements.’” Id. Other reasons a live
witness need not be produced included (1) that the witness identified the accuser as her assailant;
(2) that the police officer testified he did not feel safe until the accused was placed in a police
cruiser after the interview concluded; (3) “the record simply does not reveal what the deputy’s
questions were” and (4) the witness was badly injured yet the deputy waited to call medical
personnel to help the accuser until all the statements were gathered. Id. at 266-67.
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One example of a lower court continuing to allow statements taken at
the scene despite the Court’s ruling in Hammon is State v. Rodriguez,261
where the alleged victim did not appear at trial and police repeated the contents of extensive conversations with her at the scene. The alleged victim
told of the time that her boyfriend, the defendant, had come home the night
before, what he said to her, and extensive testimony about the horrible types
of punishment she allegedly endured at his hands.262 Even her statement
that “the police can’t help me” came in as part of the narrative of what she
talked about with the officer that night. The statements were the backbone
of the prosecution against him for battery and intimidation.263 The
Wisconsin appeals court began its analysis with the words: “Every
defendant in a criminal case is entitled to confront his or her accusers.” The
decision ends by determining that all the statements were properly admitted
without a live witness because under Davis, the confrontation guarantee
does not apply to this accuser because of the way the accusations were
gathered by police. The Court starts with the state-of-mind analysis,
writing that “when police talk to an attack-victim when the stress and
cognitive disruption caused by the attack is still dominant,” there is no
confrontation right “because the key consideration . . . focuses on an objective analysis of the out-of-court declarant’s expectation as to how what he
or she tells law enforcement will be used.”264 The Court then proceeds to
the intent-of-the-officers and the formality test:
It also cannot be said that, objectively, the officers intended to
record past activities rather than assess the then-current situation.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Record that indicates that anything either Ms. LaMoore or her daughter told the officers during
that first encounter was in response to any sort of structured
interrogation to questioning beyond simple inquiries. Simply put,
Officers Sterling and Kurtz did not go to the LaMoore house
looking for evidence with which to prosecute Rodriguez, and, after
they arrived their focus was not on building a case against him but,
rather, trying to ensure the safety of Ms. LaMoore and her

261. 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
262. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d at 140-41.
263. Id. at 140. There were plenty of supporting facts such as redness on the side of the
victim’s face, a bruise on the top and back of her head and the incriminating fact that defendant
was found a couple of days later hiding from the police underneath a couch in his home with a
knife, and another witness’ out-of-court testimony also admitted without confrontation, bolstered
the primary witness’ account. Id. at 140. These facts might lead a court to wish to affirm the
conviction but the facts do not determine the outcome of the Confrontation Clause analysis. Id.
264. See id. at 147 (citing Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2272-73); Manuel, 697 N.W.2d at 82.
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daughter, and other members of the community. Thus, those outof-court declarations were not testimonial.265
This analysis conveniently neglects the Hammon decision and the
Supreme Court’s discussion surrounding Hammon. Davis encourages
lower courts to read Hammon’s outcome as an anomaly for on the scene
domestic violence calls, opining that “officers called to investigate . . . need
to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation.”266 In
Hammon, like Rodriguez, the officers also did not go to the home looking
for evidence with which to prosecute a particular defendant, but were also
answering a domestic violence call and objectively understood, they would
need to assure the safety of members of the community and talk to the alleged victim to determine how next to proceed. Also in Hammon, there was
no structured police questioning but only the question “what happened.”
The only real difference between Hammon and the Wisconsin case is
the different conclusions the two courts reached on similar facts. The
Supreme Court concluded that the police in Hammon were establishing past
facts while Rodriguez concluded that the police were not. With just a
different conclusion on similar facts, the Wisconsin court expands the Davis
case holding to the point that it contradicts the holding in Hammon. Owing
to the Supreme Court’s ambiguity, the newly announced rejuvenation of
confrontation jurisprudence will not cause the demise of trial by out-ofcourt accusation.
Davis was the Court’s opportunity to correct lower courts in the
domestic violence area that had flouted Crawford’s mandate for a meaningful opportunity for juries to determine the reliability of the witnesses against
the accused, namely face-to-face confrontation with cross-examination.
Instead of correcting the ambiguities of Crawford that had tacitly permitted
such a limited reading of Crawford, the Davis Court instead provided
additional ambiguities, inviting lower courts to continue sanctioning trials
by out-of-court accusation. With Davis, the Court replaced its broad pronouncements of two years before with narrow theories of confrontation

265. Id. at 147.
266. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme Court’s implication that virtually
any “initial inquiries” at the crime scene will not be testimonial . . . we do not hold the
opposite—that no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers. We have
already observed of domestic disputes that “[o]fficers called to investigate . . . need to
know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their
own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.” . . . Such exigencies may
often mean that “initial inquiries” produce nontestimonial statements.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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rights derived from the lower court decisions that had failed to implement
Crawford’s broad policy pronouncements.267
VIII. STRAINING AT THE LEASH: A JURISPRUDENCE
PERSPECTIVE
Most researchers adopt a principal-agent approach to lower court
decision-making, in which lower courts are expected to implement the decisions of the Supreme Court.268 The principle-agent theory is a normative
theory of how lower courts are supposed to function, where judges do not
vote based on their own values or political persuasion.269 Social scientists
and other theorists interested in finding out what actually happens in
practice have established that in reality, lower courts are influenced to some
degree by judges’ own ideological preferences when they apply Supreme
Court doctrines.270 As Barry Friedman succinctly noted: “Outside the legal
267. See People v. Brenn, 152 Cal. App. 4th 166, 178, (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (providing that
Davis was viewed as a capitulation to lower court’s narrow construction of Crawford by relying
on a pre-Davis case for defining the term testimonial); see also People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App.
4th 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (illustrating a pre-Davis case that read Crawford to exclude
almost all domestic cases, opining “it is difficult to identify any circumstances under which a . . .
spontaneous statement would be ‘testimonial’”). Brenn wrote: “Preliminary questions asked at the
scene of a crime shortly after it has occurred do not rise to the level of an ‘interrogation.’ Such
unstructured interaction between officer and witness bears no resemblance to a formal or informal
police inquiry that is required for a police ‘interrogation’ as that term is used in Crawford.”
Brenn, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 178 (quoting Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 469). In other words,
never mind that Davis held that the unstructured interaction in Hammon was testimonial;
California continues to construe the clause otherwise.
268. Kim, supra note 15, at 386-87 n.13. The principal-agent approach is summed up in an
article by George & Yoon as follows:
Since the Supreme Court is formally at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the Court’s
decisions can be conceptualized as a principal directing (or attempting to direct) its
agents, the lower courts. The Supreme Court has limited resources to monitor the
actions of lower federal courts and state courts; therefore, the possibility arises that
judges will not comply with Supreme Court preferences. The Court obviously wishes
to check these inconsistent rulings, but monitoring and enforcement is costly.
Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal Court System: A Principal-Agent Perspective,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 819, 819 (2003). See also Mathew D. McCubbins, et al., Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243-44 (1987); Barry
M. Mitnick, The Theory of Agency: The Policing “Paradox” and Regulatory Behavior, 24 PUB.
CHOICE 27, 40 (1975); Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI.
739, 770 (1984); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent
Perspective, 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 154-58 (1984).
269. See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 10, at 258 (“Constitutional theory is all about
cabining law from politics, both to ensure that judges are constrained by law (and thus do not
simply vote their own values) and to prevent politics from influencing law.”).
270. Id.; Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95. See also Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1515 (2003) (concluding that appellate
judges follow both the legal model and the political or ideological model of decisionmaking).
Cross summarizes the empirical literature including a researcher named Daniel A. Pinello. Id. at
1481. Pinello analyzed 79,000 decisions and concluded that the political model of decisionmaking explain just under one quarter of circuit court decisions. Id. at 1481. Cross then does his
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academy, the interest in how judges behave is more ‘positive.’ That is to
say, the focus in other disciplines is not so much on how judges should
behave, as on how they do and why.”271 By reviewing data from a closed
network of judicial decisions, social scientists concluded that judicial
attitudes have demonstrably affected appellate decisionmaking of federal
circuit courts in a significant subset of cases.272
Social scientists have several theories about when lower courts resist
applying Supreme Court doctrines, and they all resonate in the Confrontation Clause arena. One theory is that judges are more likely to follow
their own attitudes in “controversial civil libert[ies] cases.”273 A second
theory is that judges are less likely to follow the high court decision when
the judges have their own policy preference and have already made
decisions based on this policy.274 The third theory looks at the Supreme
Court decision that provides the precedent, finding that judges are less
likely to follow the high court when the Supreme Court is ambiguous and
the case law is overly complex.275
All of these situations were at play following Crawford v. Washington.
The right to confront one’s accuser is a civil liberty that remains
controversial. There are many countervailing policy arguments to be made
against the right to confront one’s accusers. One realistic concern is that
domestic violence cases will be dismissed if the Confrontation Clause requires the complainant to testify at trial.276 Many domestic violence victims
choose not to prosecute, and where there is a history of abuse, there is
always a possibility that the person was threatened into not proceeding with
the case.277 That means that some people who commit crimes will get away
own research and concludes that ideology influences the outcome thirty-three percent or more in
certain situations. Id. at 1506. He also concluded that the political model of decisionmaking is
most likely underestimated in empirical measurements. Id. at 1514. For a prime example of
scholarship by non-lawyers see Songer et al., supra note 11, at 688-89. Songer concluded that in
the search and seizure area, circuit court panel decisions were influenced both by precedent and
the ideology of the judges on the appeals court panels. Id.
271. Friedman, supra note 10, at 258.
272. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95.
273. Songer et al., supra note 11, at 676.
274. See id. (providing that “the lower judges’ own policy preferences and whether their
prior actions have created a commitment to an alternative interpretation will affect the nature of
their response”).
275. See id. (“Johnson and Canon (1984) suggests that lower courts will be most responsive
when the Supreme Court’s policy is clear, unambiguous, not overly complex, and readily
available.”).
276. Lininger, supra note 5, at 709-10 n.76 (estimating that eighty to ninety percent of
domestic violence victims recant or do not come to court).
277. The doctrine of forfeiture is supposed to protect the government in instances where the
absence of the witness is caused by improper conduct on the part of the defendant. See Davis v.
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006) (“One who obtains the absence of a witness by
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with them if witnesses do not show up for trial. Even if the person charged
is factually innocent, there is a deterrence value in not dismissing charges.
Another problem for lower courts is judicial economy. A system of justice
based upon live witnesses who testify under oath subject to crossexamination takes time and court resources. It is much more efficient to
truncate trials. Of course dismissing cases will also improve judicial
economy, but given public attitudes towards domestic types of crime, it is
more likely that a stronger confrontation right will often mean continuances
of trial dates and a dispatch of police investigators to the home of missing
witnesses, thereby consuming more judicial resources. Additionally, appellate judges generally prefer affirming criminal convictions and disfavor
excluding evidence necessary for conviction.278 Implementing the Confrontation Clause, therefore, certainly constitutes a controversial civil liberty.
Even if certain reasons are not explicitly stated in an opinion, they nevertheless can help shape the contours of the post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause.279
The second theory above, that judges who have already made decisions
based on their own policy preferences are less likely to follow high court
decisions, also plays out in domestic abuse cases. Common sense would
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”). This doctrine is beyond the scope
of this article. However, the doctrine is not designed to bar the application of the Confrontation
Clause in instances where witnesses freely choose not to cooperate. Thus, in Crawford, the Court
did not apply the forfeiture doctrine where the witness asserted the husband-wife privilege. See
generally Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 71 MO.
L. REV. 285, 307-13 (2006). In Davis, the Court writes: “We take no position on the standards
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts using Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(6), which codifies the forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
278. See Songer et al., supra note 11 at 678.
279. Davis addresses this issue directly thus:
Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the nature
of the offenses charged in these two cases—domestic violence—requires greater
flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular type of crime is
notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she
does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal
a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the
effect of allowing the guilty to go free.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. at 2280. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Network to End
Domestic Violence, Indiana and Washington Coalitions Against Domestic Violence, Legal
Momentum, et al. in Support of Respondents, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (Nos
05-522A, 05-5705), 2006 WL 284229 (arguing that the forfeiture doctrine does not adequately
solve the problem of prosecuting domestic violence cases and seeking a narrow definition of
testimonial so that prosecutions can proceed in the domestic violence arena). See generally
Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit
Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 10-22 (2002); Mark Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases: About a Third of
Jurisdictions Prosecute Even Without Victim’s Testimony, 81 A.B.A. J. 14, 14 (1995) (providing
an earlier article proposing the expansion of hearsay exceptions in domestic violence cases).
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predict that the Confrontation Clause would be an area where judges would
have strong preferences or attitudes, particularly as these rights apply to
domestic abuse trials. Some judges are likely to have a strong due process
perspective, but the policy arguments in favor of confrontation rights may
seem too abstract to many judges, particularly if they assume that those
convicted without the opportunity to confront their accusers are factually
guilty. Before Crawford, many appellate courts had been affirming the use
of excited utterances in place of live testimony, possibly reflecting the
policy preferences of the judges on those courts. Finally, as the third theory
would predict, the Crawford opinion is notoriously ambiguous and complex. Hence, social scientists would predict that lower courts would resist
implementation of broad rights for confrontation in domestic violence
cases.
One important article by positivist theorists looked at how the Supreme
Court would respond when lower courts resist implementing Supreme
Court decisions. The researchers assumed that lower court judges are likely
to resist implementation of Supreme Court rulings with which they
disagree.280 Even if judges accept the norms of deference and precedent as
one of their motivations in reaching a decision, “we assume that judges do
not check their political ideologies at the courthouse door” they wrote.281
The article was written by two political scientists and a professor of public
policy who combined their names into the name “McNollgast.”282
McNollgast theorized that the Supreme Court induces lower courts to
adhere to its choice of doctrine by broadening or narrowing the scope of its
rulings.283 Where most lower courts generally agree with the Court’s
doctrine in an area of law, the Court can create a narrow doctrine that gives
lower courts less flexibility in implementing the decision.284
In contrast, when most lower courts differ substantially from the
preferred doctrine of the Supreme Court, the problem of noncompliance becomes important. Our theory suggests that the Supreme

280. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1641-47 (1995).
281. Id. at 1636-37.
282. McNollgast is a combination of three people: Matthew McCubbins, Professor of
Political Science, University of California, San Diego; Roger Noll, Morris M. Doyle Professor of
Public Policy, Stanford University; Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution; and Barry Weingast,
Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. McNollgast, supra note 280, at
n.a1. Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers And Positive Political Theory: The Tug Of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 672 (1992).
283. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1634.
284. Id.; see also McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 105, 110 (2006).
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Court will expand the range of lower court decisions that it finds
acceptable when faced with substantial noncompliance by the
lower courts. By expanding the latitude allowed under its precedents, the Court both cajoles some lower bench jurists to abide by
the new precedents and isolates those who do not. The Court can
then focus its attention on the most egregiously nonconforming
lower court decisions, and on the issues it most cares about.285
By broadening the scope of a doctrine, the Supreme Court induces
lower courts to obey, because there will be fewer noncompliant courts and
these become isolated and are possible targets for review and reversal.
McNollgast coins the term “doctrinal interval” to mean “the range of particular, perhaps inconsistent rules that are acceptable to the Supreme Court
when reviewing decisions by a lower court.”286 Under the McNollgast
theory, lower courts subtly shape Supreme Court doctrine, not by changing
the choice of doctrine, but by convincing the Supreme Court to create
greater leeway within the new doctrine. Lower court resistance, therefore,
creates larger doctrinal intervals.
This theory fits the recent interplay between the lower courts and the
Supreme Court in Confrontation Clause doctrine. First, there is what
McNollgast called a shock, a new ruling in some cases inspired by new
legal theories.287 Indeed, the Crawford shock to Confrontation Clause
doctrine was occasioned by the writings of several scholars.288 Second,
once the Supreme Court chooses to accept a case and announces a new
legal doctrine, “each lower court in future cases decides whether to comply
with the new doctrine.”289 This article has examined the cases after
Crawford. Third, the Supreme Court decides which appeals to hear as a
means of forcing compliance on lower courts and decides whether to alter
its doctrine. In the Confrontation Clause arena, the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in two domestic violence cases and Davis altered the legal
doctrine. The McNollgast theory also looked at another step in the process
beyond the scope of this article, namely decisions of the legislature and
federal branch of government whether to intervene. This article focuses on
the influence the lower courts exert on the Supreme Court by resisting a

285. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1634.
286. Id. at 1639.
287. Id. at 1640.
288. In Crawford, the Court writes “Members of this Court and academics have suggested
that we revise our doctrine to reflect more accurately the original understanding of the Clause.”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (citing A. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31 (1997)).
289. McNollgast, supra note 280, at 1640.
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new doctrine and testing the validity of the McNollgast theory in the
context of confrontation rights and challenging the new normative theory of
Pauline Kim, who encourages lower court judges to follow their own policy
leanings.290
While the McNollgast article has been well respected,291 empiricists
have found that most courts do not resist Supreme Court precedents.292
Social scientists have demonstrated that by-in large, lower federal courts
conform to the principal-agent model and faithfully implement Supreme
Court precedent.293 The number of cases where researchers found incongruence between the Supreme Court and lower courts is but a fraction of the
number of cases where judges conform to Supreme Court precedent.294
However, the lower court decisions analyzed in this article suggest that
these empiricists may be mistaken about the level of noncompliance.
To social scientists gathering data, the Confrontation Clause area of
law may look very different from the way it appears to lawyers and legal
scholars. It would be unlikely for a social scientist to decide that lower
courts were not following the Supreme Court’s Crawford decision when the
Supreme Court then turned around and adopted the reasoning of the lower
courts. Those trained in the law must determine whether, as I suggest, the
lower courts in Davis failed to implement the policy doctrine announced in
Crawford, or whether lower courts did precisely what they were expected to
do, namely, they took a new fact pattern (the 911 caller or informal police
questioning at the scene) and applied the precedent (Crawford) as best as
they could.295 For example, social scientists would code the Washington
court decision in Davis as compliant with precedent because the conviction
was affirmed on appeal, but this would be misleading because in fact, the
doctrine changed on appeal. If I am right that this was a case of the lower

290. Kim, supra note 15, at 408-26.
291. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2027, 2101 n.207 (2002); David. S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the
Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 497 n.97 (2005); Ernest A.
Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1208 n.272
(2005).
292. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:
The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decision-Making, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
293. Kim, supra note 15, at 394-95.
294. Chad Westerland et al., Lower Court Defiance of (Compliance With) The U.S. Supreme
Court, 4, 16 (2006), http://www.princeton.edu/~ccameron/Defiance.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2007). See also Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance
and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL.
Q., 297, 297-316 (1990).
295. See Kim, supra note 15, at 442 (questioning the normative assumption that “lower
courts should also conform to the policy preferences of the Supreme Court, even when not
expressed in binding decisional law”).
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court causing the Supreme Court to alter its doctrine, this would be invisible
to empirical researchers. Thus, the extent of lower court resistance may be
precisely as the McNollgast team assumed.
One key question not addressed by the McNollgast team is, assuming
that lower courts were resisting the large policy shift, was this behavior legitimate? The answer turns in part on how one defines the role of the lower
courts. Traditional legal theory forbids a court from taking into account its
own preferences.296 Professor Kim argued that our system should expect
lower courts to follow their own policy attitudes when the Court gives them
latitude to do so.297 Kim’s normative view did not embrace full-scale resistance by the lower courts. Instead, Kim theorized that lower courts must
conform their rulings to Supreme Court precedent.298 It is only where the
Court allows discretion that lower court judges may assert their own policy
preferences in deciding cases rather than adopting the policy enunciated by
the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Kim’s theory breaks with the traditional
constitutional theory where judges are expected to implement the policy of
the Supreme Court and not act on their own politics and values.299 Kim’s
theory also reflects a different understanding of how resistance works in
practice from the theory announced by the McNollgast team. Kim assumed
that the lower courts shirk precedent without violating the legal rules of
precedent. In contrast, the McNollgast team theory assumed that judges
will follow their own policy prerogatives, and that the ideals instilled during
law school of following precedent and the rule of law only form some of
the attitudinal preferences of judges.
One problem with Kim’s theory is that she too facilely distinguished
between courts that fail to follow precedent from those that follow precedent but do not follow Supreme Court policy. This distinction is easier to
make theoretically than to apply in an actual set of cases such as the Confrontation Clause decisions. Applying her theory to Confrontation Clause
doctrine, empiricists may conclude the lower courts were behaving
correctly when they refused to apply Crawford’s broad mandate. After all,
Crawford was vague about the contours of its new jurisprudence, inviting
lower appellate courts to implement the new rules according to their own
policy perspectives. Lower courts had a great deal of discretion, empiricists

296. Cross, supra note 270, at 1463. See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court,
1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 64-65
(1992) (“Courts are to stick to law, judgment, and reason in making their decisions and should
leave politics, will, and value choice to others.”).
297. Kim, supra note 15, at 442.
298. Id.
299. Sullivan, supra note 296, at 64-65.
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might conclude, because Crawford only decided the case before it and left
to another day a comprehensive view of the new jurisprudence. Indeed, all
the language in Crawford about the deeply embedded right to face one’s
accusers represents mere policy. Lower courts instituted their own policy
preferences in favor of less confrontation rights and less change from recent
trial practices. Therefore, one may conclude the lower courts were following Kim’s model, legitimately resisting the Court’s views—“shirking” as
the social scientists label it—but all legitimately, without violating any
textbook model of judicial behavior.300
On the other hand, other empiricists could draw the opposite
conclusion and find that lower courts were not following precedent after
Crawford. Lower courts implementing a formality rationale cannot have
been correct when they decided that colloquial interrogation meant stationhouse interviews nor could Crawford have meant that the Framers would
have wanted to encourage less formality in obtaining statements for trial.
Lower courts implementing a state-of-mind rationale also could not have
been correct given that Crawford itself likely would have come out
differently if the Supreme Court had utilized the this lower court approach
to Mrs. Crawford’s state-of-mind.301 Nor could lower courts implementing
the intent-of-the-officers rationale have been correct when the Crawford
opinion itself did not propose the intent of the questioner as a possible core
definition and the Court could not have intended to base confrontation
rights on whether conversations with police occurred on doorsteps or at the
kitchen table. Hence, empiricists may conclude, as this article does, that
most lower courts were not following Crawford’s precedent when they
applied the case to domestic violence prosecutions.
I coin the term “straining at the leash” in order to avoid having to
determine whether the lower courts were following precedent or not. PostCrawford cases demonstrate that empiricists would have difficulty determining whether lower courts legitimately resisted Supreme Court policy
arguments or whether their resistance violated precedent. Kim’s assumption that lower courts follow precedent even when they shirk the policy is

300. Justice Scalia wrote the following in a law review article reviewing a book on legal
philosophy:
[T]he fact that the “holding” of a judicial opinion—the portion of its text or the aspect
of its disposition that binds later courts—is almost infinitely expandable or contractable, ranging from the mere prescription that these particular facts produce this particular result to the broad “rationale” expressed by the court to justify that prescription.
Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 687, 688
(2006).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37 (discussing what Ms. Crawford was
thinking).
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difficult to verify and is probably inaccurate given this article’s dissection
of the case law arising between Crawford and Davis.
In trying to classify lower court domestic abuse Confrontation Clause
decisions after Crawford as legitimate or illegitimate under Kim’s theory,
we find it almost impossible to sort out Crawford’s policy from its value as
precedent. Crawford is a particularly apt example of a case that cries out
for lower courts to implement the policy behind the decision. By its very
ambiguity and lofty language it begged lower courts to employ the new
policy considerations to help the Court determine the full scope of the opinion. To reduce Crawford’s precedential value to a reversal of a conviction
because a statement was wrongly introduced under the declaration against
interest exception is to miss Crawford’s decision altogether. In this situation, for lower courts to introduce their own policy is the same thing as not
following precedent, resisting implementation, as McNollgast calls it, or not
conforming, as other theorists describe it. Even if one concludes that the
decisions followed precedent, it seems fair to call what the lower courts did
shirking. This calls into question Kim’s normative suggestion that law benefits when lower courts employ their own values rather than following the
Supreme Court.
Most disturbing about giving the green light to value-driven decisions
by lower courts is that Kim suggests it as an approach to all areas of law,
including Supreme Court decisions on the protections in the Bill of Rights.
Even if Kim is generally correct that lower courts may improve upon case
law development if they employ their own policy preferences, when it
comes to criminal justice issues this is not true. Rights for the accused are
politically unpopular and this is precisely the reason for constitutional
amendments designed to protect these rights. Whenever there is a decision
that favors the rights of the accused, there is likely to be resistance from the
lower courts and perhaps from the public and political branches as well.
But this resistance is not to be celebrated. The resistance of the lower
courts should not be viewed as acceptable when it concerns implementation
of constitutional rights for those without much power in the legislative
system.
IX. CONCLUSION
State court decisions interpreted Crawford v. Washington too narrowly,
especially in domestic violence cases. These decisions exploited Crawford’s ambiguities to limit the reach of Crawford so that trial courts could
continue to allow the government to repeat prior accusations at trial in place
of live testimony. State and lower courts used three different rationales to
exclude statements made to 911 operators or to police at the scene from the
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scope of the Sixth Amendment. In the wake of Crawford, some courts
looked at the formality of the statements at issue to determine if they were
within the scope of the Confrontation Clause while other courts considered
the state-of-mind of the person making the statement to narrow the reach of
statements made to 911 operators or to police at the scene. A few courts
looked at the intent of the officers in gathering the statements. The
rationales were wrong for different reasons, but all deny Crawford’s vision
of a return to the principle that “no man shall be prejudiced by evidence
which he had not the liberty to cross-examine.” 302
In a period of two years, we observed the Supreme Court announce an
ambitious albeit ambiguous plan to restore confrontation rights to criminal
defendants followed by a second Court decision, Davis, which retreated
from its earlier pronouncements and actually adopted much of the analysis
of the lower courts. This suggests that at least part of the explanation for
this retreat from Crawford’s bold pronouncement of a return to trial by
witness is that the Court was responsive to the lower court resistance.
Other law reviews may look to the internal dynamic between the Supreme
Court justices to determine outcome, but this inquiry may not explain how
the theories developed to rationalize a shrunken confrontation right that
took root in Davis but not in Crawford. This article traces how these rationales appeared in the lower courts before they were adopted at least in part,
by the Supreme Court. It appears that the dog strained on the leash and the
owner changed direction almost back to where it was before.303
Pauline Kim’s recent normative theory embraces the idea that lower
courts should employ their own policy prerogatives when implementing
Supreme Court precedent. The domestic violence cases examined in this
article challenge Kim’s theory. The decisions challenge the notion that
lower courts can faithfully implement a Supreme Court decision when they
are guided by policy considerations drastically different than those articulated by the Court. The decision challenges the notion that when a Supreme
Court decision is strong on policy but weak on specifics, whether there is
any way to follow precedent without following the newly articulated
Supreme Court policy. In addition, the domestic violence cases challenge
the notion that it is normatively preferable for lower courts to ignore
Supreme Court policy preferences when the cases involve the constitutional

302. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103
(Super. L. & Eq. 1794)).
303. This straining at the leash is different in kind from the normal principal-agent perspective where lower courts “can influence the Court’s agenda by anticipating or moving ahead of the
Court on certain issues, taking the lead on new legal questions or new approaches.” George &
Yoon, supra note 268, at 825.
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rights of those accused of crimes. Because criminal defendants have so
little power in the legislative system they rely on the courts to implement
the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections. If lower courts make
decisions that promote efficiency at the expense of the right to face one’s
accusers, the only likely redress is the Supreme Court. When the Supreme
Court tells the lower courts that under the Sixth Amendment the policy
should favor the right to confront one’s accusers, the decision means little if
lower courts do not follow the policy. There are so few cases that actually
end up before the Supreme Court that the Court’s only real power in the
system is the institutional systems of precedent and rule of law. When
lower courts did not adopt Crawford’s policy preference in favor of trial by
live witness and instead focused on factual distinctions between the
Crawford case and the cases before them in order to affirm convictions
based on allegations repeated at witnessless trials, Crawford became toothless. There are too few cases to reach the Supreme Court for the Court to
be able to withstand such widespread resistance. Clothed in wonderful
phrases that harkened back to the days when witnesses had to come to
court, take the oath, and testify live before a jury, Crawford actually
became a decision that narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause.304
What we learn from examining this subset of cases is that when the
Supreme Court broadens constitutional rights, lower courts should strive to
implement the policy behind the new decision.

304. Although Crawford prevented an ever expanding array of reliable hearsay from being
introduced without live witnesses, Crawford also narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause
by allowing unreliable statements to be introduced at trial without the usual tools to determine
reliability, namely confrontation. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. See also W. Jeremy Counseller &
Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth,
Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3, 19 (2005); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,
2268 (2006) (“A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must
fairly be said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”).
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